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FIXTURE PRIORITIES 
David Gray Carlson* 
Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has had a 
tumultuous history.' Originally, the drafters of the Code intended to 
do no more than repeat the fixture rules as they had existed under the 
Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA).^ The real estate industry had 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; 
B.A., 1974, University of California at Santa Barbara; J.D., 1977, Hastings College of Law, 
University of California. 
' For the drafting history of section 9-313, see 2 G. Cilmore, Security Interests in Personal 
Property § 30.3, at 808-14 (1965); Kripke, The Review Committee's Proposals to Amend the 
Fixture Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 Bus. Law. 301 (1969) [hereinafter cited 
as Kripke, Review Committee]; Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 
Colum. L. Rev. 44 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Kripke, Fixtures]; Leary & Rucci, Fixing Up the 
Fixture Section of the U.C.C., 42 Temp. L.Q. 355 (1969). 
The real estate bar was quick to oppose the 1962 version of section 9-313. Its views were 
given recognition by local legislatures as well as by the Permanent Editorial Board. California, 
for example, never enacted the 1962 version of section 9-313 and only enacted the 1972 version in 
1980, Cal. Com. Code § 9313 (West Supp. 1983). Although California had a nonuniform version 
of I section 9-102 which governed the creation, perfeetion and priority of security interests in 
fixtures as between competing UCC secured parties, Cal. Com. Code § 9102 (West 1964), 
priority contests between fixture lenders and real estate interests were decided entirely under pre-
UCC case law developed without regard to the Code. Cf. Note, Uniform Commercial Code 
Section 9-313; Time for Adoption in California, 27 Hastings L.J. 235, 239 (1975). Iowa also 
failed to adopt the 1962 version of section 9-313, id. at 236, but has now opted for the 1972 
amendments, including the nevv section 9-313, Iowa Code Ann. § 554.9313 (West Supp. 1982). 
Ohio passed a versioiMjf^section 9-313, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1309.32 (Page 1979), undef 
which prior.real"estate interests always won over security interests in fixtures and real estate 
interests subsequent to perfection of security interests in fixtures always lost. This is essentially a 
reversal of the 1962 version of section 9-313. See Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for 
Purchase Money Collateral; A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem Under Section 9-313 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 Yale L.J. 788, 789 (1964). Mississippi also followed Ohio's 
lead. See Adams, Security Interests in Fixtures Under Mississippi's Uniform Commercial Code, 
47 Miss. L.J. 831, 879-88 (1976). While Ohio and Mississippi have adopted the 1972 version of 
section 9-313, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1309.32 (Page 1979), Miss. Code Ann. § 75-9-313 (1972), 
Florida copied Ohio's original legislation and still has its nonuniform section 9-313 on the books, 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 679.9-313 (West 1966). See Note, Fixture Liens Under Chapter 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code in Florida, 21 U. Fla. L. Rev. 229, 236 (1968). 
^ The full text of section 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA) is as follows; 
If the goods are so affixed to realty, at the time of a conditional sale or subsequently 
as to become a part thereof and not to be severable wholly or in any portion without 
material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property as to any portion not so 
severable shall be void after the goods are so affixed, as against any person who has 
not expressly assented to the reservation. If the goods are so affixed to realty at the 
time of a conditional sale or subsequently as to become part thereof but to be 
severable without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property shall be 
void after the goods are so affixed as against subsequent purchasers of the realty for 
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lived with those provisions without apparent hardship. Consequently, 
there was no reason to expect any objections to the perpetuation of 
those principles in the UCC. Unfortunately, the discussion of the 
fixture priorities under the UCC galvanized the real estate bar into a 
storm of protest which broke only after the 1962 version of section 9-
313 was adopted into the law of most states.® As a result of this 
controversy, scholars generated a great deal of literature on the "fix­
ture problem," and the Permanent Editoral Board, spurred on largely 
by fixtures, decided to revise all of Article 9 with a large set of 
amendments. A Review Committee was appointed for this purpose,^ 
and their work culminated in the 1972 amendments. Section 9-313 
was perhaps more radically changed than any other section of Article 
9. 
The purpose of this Article is to examine the complexities intro­
duced by the 1972 amendments into the system of fixture priorities, a 
subject which has not yet been fully explored.® Although there has 
been extensive scholarly discussion of the 1962 version of section 9-
313, a brief review of those rules is nevertheless required in order to 
understand fully the changes wrought by the 1972 amendments. 
value and without notice of the conditional seller's title, unless the conditional sale 
contract, or a copy thereof, together with a statement signed by the seller briefly 
describing the realty and stating that the goods are or are to be affixed thereto, shall 
be filed before such purchase in the offiee where a deed of the realty would be 
recorded or registered to affect such realty. As against the owner of the realty the 
reservation of the property in goods by a conditional seller shall be void when such 
goods are to be so affixed to the realty as to become a part thereof but to be severable 
without material injury to the freehold, unless the conditional sale contract, or a 
copy thereof, together with a statement signed by the seller briefly describing the 
realty and stating that the goods are to be affixed thereto, shall be filed before they 
are affixed, in the office where a deed would be recorded or registered to affect such 
realty. 
Unif. Conditional Sales Act § 7, reprinted in 3 L. Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional 
Sales § 1436, at 512 (1933) (footnote omitted). 
' Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 46-47. 
•• The Review Committee was composed of; Joe C. Barrett; Carl W. Funk; John S. 
Hastings, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit; Robert Haydock, Jr.; 
Ray David Henson; Harold Marsh, Jr.; William Curtis Pierce; Millard H. Rudd; Sterry R. 
Waterman, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; Herbert Wechsler 
(Chairman). Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 
Bus. Law. 1465, 1466 n.7 (1971). 
Professor Robert Braucher served as reporter and Professors Homer Kripke and Soia 
Mentschikoff served as associate reporters. Professor Grant Gilmore and Peter F. Googan were 
consultants, id. at 1466-67. 
® The best article so far on the 1972 version of section 9-313 is Adams, supra note 1. It is 
hoped that this article will push the analysis of section 9-313 at least a little further than that 
impressive work. 
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I. The 1962 Version of Section 9-313® 
Prior to 1962, the UCSA was the only uniform legislation govern­
ing fixture priorities. This reflected the fact that purchase money 
security interests were the principal type of fixture interest for which 
personal property lenders needed secured status.'' The 1962 version of 
section 9-313 was simply an attempt to incorporate the provisions of 
' The full text of the 1962 version of section 9-313 is as follows; 
(1) The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into a structure 
in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and the like and no 
security interest in them exists under this Article unless the structure remains per­
sonal property under applicable law. The law of this state other than this Act 
determines whether and when other goods become fixtures. This Act does not 
prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law 
applicable to real estate. 
(2) A security interest which attaches to goods before they become fixtures takes 
priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who have an interest in the real 
estate except as stated in subsection (4). 
(3) A security interest which attaches to goods after they become fixtures is valid 
against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real estate except as stated 
in subsection (4) but is invalid against any person with an interest in the real estate at 
the time the security interest attaches to the goods who has not in writing consented 
to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures. 
(4) The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take priority 
over 
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate; or 
(b) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by 
judicial proceedings; or 
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to the 
extent that he makes subsequent advances if the subsequent purchase is made, the 
lien by judicial proceedings is obtained, or the subsequent advance under the prior 
encumbrance is made or contracted for without knowledge of the security interest 
and before it is perfected. A purchaser of the real estate at a foreclosure sale other 
than an encumbrancer purchasing at his own foreclosure sale is a subsequent pur­
chaser within this section. 
(5) When under subsections (2), (3) or (4) a secured party has priority over the 
claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate, he may, on default, subject 
to the provisions of Part 5, remove his collateral from the real estate but he must 
reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor and 
who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for 
any diminution in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods 
removed or by any necessity for replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement 
may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives adequate security for 
the performance of this obligation. 
U.C.C. § 9-313 (1962). 
' See Coogan, Fixtures—Uniformity in Words or in Fact?, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1186, 1187-
88 (1965); 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 30.6, at 821 ("Almost without exception, pre-Code 
fixture financing was carried out under conditional sale: the nature of the conditional sale 
automatically restricted the priority to what, in Gode terminology, would be called purchase 
money security interests."). 
384 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:381 
section 7 of the UCSA into the UCC.® The result, however, was less 
than perfect. The principal failure was that it introduced mutually 
exclusive filing requirements.® Both the UCSA and the UCC required 
a filing in the local real estate records in order for the secured party to 
prevail over subsequent purchasers of the real estate. The UCSA, 
however, allowed an ordinary filing to perfect a conditional sale 
against subsequent lien creditors. This allowed the conditional sale to 
survive in bankruptcy, as long as some sort of perfection occurred. 
Under the 1962 version of the UCC, a fixture filing^® was ineffective to 
perfect an interest in nonfixtures, and an ordinary UCC filing was 
ineffective to perfect a fixture interest." As a result, the secured party 
Purchase money security interests collateralize loans enabling the borrower to buy goods. 
The collateral must be the very goods that were bought, and the loan must actually have been 
used for the purchase. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972). A "conditional sale" is a purchase money security 
interest where the seller of goods is also the lender. That is, the sale is made on credit. See id. §§ 
9-102(l)(a), -107(1). Purchase money security interests are further described in notes 22-23 and 
accompanying text. 
® Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 46. 
" See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1962). New York, however, had a nonuniform UCSA provision 
which did make fixture filings and nonfixture filings "mutually exclusive." See Kripke, Fixtures, 
supra note 1, at 56. 
The term "fixture filing" was used for the first time in the 1972 amendments. U.C.C. § 9-
313(1) (b) (1972). Under the 1972 amendments, a "fixture filing" is a filing in the local real estate 
records in a form which comports with the 1972 version of section 9-402(5). Section 9-402(5) 
requires that, in addition to the minimal requirements of section 9-402(1), the financing state­
ment recite that the collateral is in fact a fixture, and that the statement is to be filed in the real 
estate records. If the debtor does not have an interest in the real estate, the financing statement 
must also state the name of "a record owner." 
The term "fixture filing" will also be used to refer to the special filing that had to be made 
for fixtures under the 1962 UCC. Under those rules, the only formality required beyond those 
necessary for an ordinary UCC filing was that the financing statement describe the real estate 
affected. Then, as now, the financing statement had to be filed in the "office where a mortgage 
on the real estate would be filed." Id. § 9-401(1). 
" Under all three options for section 9-401 of the 1962 version, a fixture filing had to be 
made in the "office where a mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or recorded." 
Such a filing would not have satisfied the filing requirements for nonfixture collateral under the 
first of the options, which contemplates filing only with the secretary of state. Under the other 
two options, it was not impossible for a 1962 fixture filing in the local real estate records to have 
sufficed in perfecting unaffixed collateral. The second and third alternatives allowed filing for 
farm equipment or consumer goods in the county of the debtor's residence or (if the debtor did 
not reside in the state) in the county where the goods were kept. If this office happened to be the 
same office that received mortgage filings, perhaps a fixture filing would have sufficed to perfect 
an interest in unaffixed collateral. See id. § 9-403(1) (1962) (mere presentation of the statement 
and paying the fee constitutes filing) ; Adams, supra note 1, at 859 n.93. But see In re Leckie 
Freeburn Coal Co., 405 F.2d 1043, 1046 (6th Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969) ("It is 
true that the proper Clerk did receive the instrument for filing. . . . However, this was not 
sufficient to comply with the [UCC]. . . . [M]ore is required of the filing party than to just hand 
the instrument to the Clerk. . . . When dealing with a multipurpose document, it is incumbent 
upon the filing party to disclose to the Clerk the purpose for recording."). 
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faced a hazardous election; if he chose incorrectly, he could find his 
security interest voided in bankruptcy. Of course, a cautious secured 
party could always have made both a fixture filing and a nonfixture 
filing. This, however, was not always a viable option. For example, 
where a purchase money lender took a security interest in potential 
fixtures sold to a corporation that owned real property in various 
locations,'^ it would have been difficult to make a fixture filing in 
exactly the right office." Elimination of mutual exclusivity of filings 
was a major motivation for amending the 1962 fixture provisions. This 
goal, as will be shown," has not yet been fully realized. 
The major function of the fixture rules was the resolution of 
priority conflicts between the fixture lenders and real estate claimants. 
The priorites under the 1962 version of section 9-313 are perhaps best 
illustrated by considering the six logical temporal possibilities that 
exist between the three important events that are relevant to establish­
ing priorities. The three events are; (a) accrual of the competing real 
estate interest, whether a judicial lien, a mortgage, or a purchase; (b) 
affixation of the personal property to the real estate; and (c) attach­
ment of the Article 9 security interest to the collateral. Using a mort­
gagee, for the moment, as a stand-in for all real estate claimants, the 
six possible temporal patterns are as follows: 
1. Mortgage-Attachment-Affixation; 
2. Mortgage-Affixation-Attachment; 
3. Attachment-Mortgage-Affixation; 
4. Affixation-Mortgage-Attachment; 
5. Attachment-Affixation-Mortgage; 
6. Affixation-Attachment-Mortgage. 
'2 See Kratovil, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Real Property Lawyer, 18 De Paul 
L. Rev. 101, 107 (1968); Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1319, 1334-35 (1962). According to Professor Gilmore, "The diversity of 
real estate recording systems approaches infinity." 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 30.5, at 818. 
" In many cases, a lender assumed that his collateral was equipment only to have a court 
deem it a fixture, e.g., Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, Inc., 25 Conn. Sup. 327, 203 A.2d 
441 (1964). Even more common were those situations where a conditional seller, assuming the 
goods to be fixtures, filed locally, only to have the court deem them to be equipment—for which 
central filing was necessary. See, e.g., In re Park Corrugated Box Corp., 249 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.J. 
1966); In re Kahl, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1322 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1972); In re 
Nelson, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 857 (Bankr. D. Utah 1969). See generally J. White & 
R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 25-9, at 1057 (2d ed. 1980) (requirements for filing 
under section 9-313(l)(h)). 
" See infra text accompanying notes 52-68. 
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A. Case One: Mortgage-Attachment-Affixation and Section 9-313(2) 
According to the drafters, where the mortgage was already in 
place before attachment or affixation of the collateral, the mortgagee 
was no longer a "reliance creditor"'® who depended on the state of the 
real estate records in deciding whether or not to lend.'® Thus, under 
section 9-313(2), which covered all "attachment-then-affixation" 
cases, the secured party won over the prior mortgagee whether or not 
his interest was perfected.''' 
In addition to the "absence of reliance" theory, two other theo­
ries supported the priority rules of section 9-313(2). The premise of the 
first was that the secured party added to the value of the real estate in 
an "attachment-then-affixation" case, and therefore should be the 
first to recover that value in case of default.'® The thinking was that 
giving priority to the earlier mortgage would provide the mortgagee 
with a windfall at the expense of the subsequent fixture lender.'® 
" The emphasis on "reliance" conformed to section 7 of the UCSA, which only required 
filing for protection against "subsequent purchasers" of real estate. According to Professor 
Gilmore, the protection of unperfected purchase money security interests from subordination to 
earlier "after-acquired property" interests dated back to the 19th century railroad cases. 2 G. 
Gilmore, supra note 1, § 28.1, at 743-48. 
This view was criticized by Peter Coogan on the theory that mortgagees might rely on the 
absence of subsequent encumbrances in deciding whether or not to foreclose on the mortgage. 
Coogan, The New UGC Article 9, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 493 (1973). Since Mr. Coogan was a 
consultant to the Review Committee which drafted the 1972 amendments, he was in an excellent 
position to weave this view into the fabric of the new section 9-313. See General Comment on the 
Approach of the Review Committee for Article 9, 3 U.L.A. 7 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Review 
Committee]. Today, perfection is required if the secured party is to have priority over earlier real 
estate interests. See U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a), (c) (1972). 
" Hartford Nafl Bank & Trust Co. v. Codin, 137 Vt. 39, 398 A.2d 286 (1979); Babson 
Credit Plan, Inc. v. Cordele Prods. Credit Ass'n, 146 Ca. App. 266, 246 S.E.2d 354 (1978). For a 
case where the language of section 9-313(2) of the 1962 version of the UCC was inexplicably 
ignored, see United States v. Baptist Golden Age Home, 226 F. Supp. 892, 903 (W.D. Ark. 1964) 
("A purchase money security interest in . . . 'fixtures' must meet the filing requirements ... in 
. . . 9-401(l)(b) to take priority over prior encumbrances of the real estate.") 
Shanker, supra note 1, at 791. Of course, the value of the land might be reduced by the 
damage done when the secured party repossesses and the fixture is removed. Section 9-313(5) 
(1962), renumbered 9-313(8) in 1972, requires the fixture lender to hold the prior real estate 
owner or encumbrancer harmless by reimbursing him "for the cost of repair of any physical 
injury." Even so, real estate owners and encumbrancers might still complain that reimbursement 
under section 9-313(8) denies them the "going concern" value of the real estate. Adams, supra 
note 1, at 855 n.74. 
This ignores the fact that many fixtures are replacements for those already in place at the 
time the mortgage interest arose. Since the value of the mortgagee's interest encompassed the 
value of the original fixtures, it could he argued that giving him priority in the new fixtures 
would in no way provide him a windfall. See Keil Motor Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 43 
Del. 322, 47 A.2d 164 (Super. Ct. 1941). In Keil, a furnace which had been in place at the time 
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From the standpoint of the earlier mortgagee, the priorities under 
section 9-313(2) were not believed to be prejudicial since the value of 
the real estate would be enhanced by at least the value of the fixture. 
In fact, priority for fixture financing was thought to be a positive 
benefit to the real estate mortgagee, since the premises could thereby 
be kept in good repair.^" 
The second theory underlying section 9-313(2) related to the 
simple order of property transfer. By the time the personal property 
was affixed, it had already been encumbered by the secured party's 
interest. The mortgage lien could, therefore, attach only to the 
debtor's equity, if any, and not to that part of the fixture collateral 
already subject to a security interest. 
These three theories are also the general justifications for pur­
chase money priority. The 1962 version of section 9-313(2) did not 
require purchase money status, yet these purchase money justifica­
tions applied equally well to nonpurchase money security interests in 
fixtures where there had been "attachment-then-affixation." In fact, 
the "property transfer" theory had greater validity in fixture cases 
than in other purchase money cases. In a straight purchase money 
case, involving personal property, where a prior secured party or lien 
creditor had a right to after-acquired property, the interests of the two 
secured parties and the debtor all arose simultaneously.Neverthe­
less, the "already encumbered" reasoning of the "property transfer" 
theory was thought to be applicable.In a fixture case, it is inevitable 
that the prior mortgagee cannot obtain an interest in the collateral 
until it has been affixed and has become real estate. Where attach-
the mortgage arose was removed and replaced with a new one that was subject to a conditional 
sales agreement. Because the old furnace was "worthless" at the time of its removal, the court 
concluded that its removal could have had "no effect upon the security of the mortgage." Id. at 
331, 47 A.2d at 168. Thus, giving the mortgagee priority over the conditional seller would be 
providing him a windfall. Cf. Lumpkin v. Holland Furnace Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 313, 178 A. 788 
(1935). Under circumstances similar to those in Keil, the court held, inter alia, that where new 
fixtures are substitutes for those in place when the mortgage arose, the conditional seller's 
attempt to reserve title was void as against the nonassenting mortgagee. 
Professor Gilmore wrote that the problem of waste, followed by replacement with encum­
bered goods, was wisely ignored by the drafters of the 1962 Code and suggests that pre-Code 
cases such as Lumpkin might still govern. 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 30.6, at 836. 
Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-17. 
" See Babson Credit Plan, Inc. v. Cordele Prods. Credit Ass'n, 146 Ga. App. at 271 246 
S.E.2d at 358. 
" See United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362, 364-65 (1870); Robinson 
V. Wright, 90 Colo. 417, 9 P.2d 618 (1932). This is the "delightful idea of transitory or 
instantaneous seisin." Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 Harv. L. Rev 1333 1340 
(1963). 
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ment preceded affixation, the secured party's interest in the collateral 
was clearly prior in time, not merely simultaneous. Section 9-313(2), 
therefore, could be viewed as a "first in time is first in right" rule' 
whereas standard purchase money priority cannot be so easily 
viewed.^' 
B. Case Two: Mortgage-Affixation-Attachment and Section 9-313(3) 
In those cases where the collateral was affixed to the real estate 
before the security interest attached,^^ the priorities were the reverse 
of those under 9-313(2). Under 9-313(3), the prior mortgagee always 
won, and the secured party could do nothing (absent a subordination 
agreement) to achieve priority. 
In an affixation-then-attachment case, the purchase money 
theories supporting the priority rule of 9-313(2) were inapposite. Here 
the secured party took an interest in collateral that was already sub­
ject to the mortgage lien. In this circumstance, the rule of "first in 
time is first in right" demanded that the mortgagee win. Further­
more, the secured party, rather than adding value to the real estate, 
was doing quite the opposite. He was clearly depriving it of value! 
The secured party would, therefore, lose his claim to priority over the 
previous mortgagee. 
Subordination to earlier mortgagees did not render financing 
impossible where affixation preceded attachment. The fixture lender 
could still have priority over subsequent purchasers or subsequent lien 
Professors Jackson and Kronman add yet another justification for purchase money prior­
ity. They point out that without purchase money priority, a lender with an after-acquired 
property interest can prevent other lenders from being senior, has already sunk policing costs, 
and therefore has monopoly power over the debtor who needs another loan. The purchase 
money priority, however, allows another lender to bid against the after-acquired property lender 
for the debtor s business, thereby eliminating the monopoly power held by the after-acquired 
property lender. Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors 88 
Yale L.J. 1143, 1167-75 (1979). 
This same rationale works for nonpurchase money security interests in fixtures. An earlier 
real estate mortgagee also has a competitive advantage for making future fixture loans unless 
priority can be given to some other lender. Section 9-312(2) (1962) therefore allows for competi­
tion in making loans to the debtor on property which is to become fixtures. 
E.g., State Bank v. Kahn, 58 Misc. 2d 655, 296 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (lender did 
not advance funds for swimming pool until construction was complete). 
The opposite result is illustrated by Sunshine v. Sanray Floor Covering Corp., 64 Mise. 2d 
780, 315 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1970). There, the failure to execute a written security agree­
ment prior to the affixation of the collateral defeated the interest of the conditional seller. 
The result in Sunshine was approved by the 1972 amendments, which require a writing as a 
precondition to attachment. U.C.C. § 9-203 (Reasons for 1972 Change). See infra note 123. 
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creditors if he perfected his interest or if the holder of the subsequent 
interest had knowledge of the intervening fixture interest.He could 
also have priority over the subsequent advances made by the earlier 
mortgagee, if the mortgagee had knowledge of the unperfected secur­
ity interest, or if the security interest had been perfected by the time of 
the advance. 
The use of goods already affixed to real estate as collateral was an 
innovation over the UCSA.^® The post-affixation security interest was 
not, however, the only "real estate" in which a chattel security inter­
est could be created. It may seem anomalous that "real estate" could 
be encumbered by chattel security interests. Yet many states have 
a l w a y s  a l l o w e d  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  c h a t t e l  m o r t g a g e s  o n  c r o p s . T o ­
day, the UCC allows security interests in three different types of real 
estate—crops, timber, and, of course, fixtures. 
C. Cases Three and Four: Where the Mortgage Arose Between At­
tachment and Affixation 
In his article on the 1962 fixture rules, Mr. Coogan wondered 
whether a real estate interest which accrued between attachment and 
affixation or between affixation and attachment was subsequent or 
prior to the security interest.^® While there was legitimate confusion 
where future advances under a mortgage were involved,®® the result in 
other cases was quite clear. When the mortgage arose between the 
two Article 9 events it was clearly a prior mortgage explicitly gov­
erned by section 9-313(2) (if attachment preceded affixation) and by 
section 9-313(3) (if the temporal order was reversed). "Subsequent," 
therefore, as used in section 9-313(4) could only have meant "subse­
quent to both attachment and affixation." Only where the mortga­
gee's interest arose after the two events could section 9-313(4) govern 
the priorities.®^ Thus, the priority of the secured fixture lender vis-a-
" U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(1962); see infra text accompanying notes 32-34. 
See Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 55. 
" Modesto Bank v. Owens, 121 Cal. 223, 53 P. 552 (1898). See generally Smith, Security 
Interests in Crops, 10 Hastings L.J. 23, 156 (1958). 
Section 9-105(l)(h) includes fixtures, standing timber and growing crops in the definition 
of "goods." See U.C.C.§ 9-102(l)(a) ("this Article applies ... to any transaction . . . which is 
intended to create a security interest in . . . goods"). Significantly, unsevered minerals are not 
goods under section 9-105(l)(h). 
Coogan, supra note 7, at 1228 n.l8; see also Adams, supra note 1, at 848-49. 
See infra text accompanying notes 34-40. 
" Coogan reaches the same result by means of a policy argument based on the reasoning 
that, in an "attachment-mortgage-affixation" case, the mortgagee would not rely on subsequent 
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vis the mortgagee in these types of "sandwich" cases depended solely 
upon the order in which attachment and affixation had occurred. 
D. Cases Five and Six: Subsequent Mortgages and Seetion 9-313(4) 
Under the 1962 Code, perfection of security interests in fixtures 
was necessary or helpful only where a real estate interest arose subse­
quent to both attachment and affixation.^® The unperfected secured 
party could still gain priority if the mortgagee had "knowledge" of the 
unperfected secured interest.®® The effect of "knowledge" on the or­
dering of priorities was consistent with the prevailing theory of the 
1962 Code—that it was to be, in large part, a "race-notice" statute, 
not a "race" statute.®^ 
Under section 9-313(4) of the 1962 Code, particular complexity 
occurred in the context of future advances made under a real estate 
mortgage after the security interest attached to affixed collateral but 
before it was perfected. Section 9-313(4)(c) expressly stated that all 
future advances made under prior mortgages were to be considered 
subsequent to the extent of the advance. No distinction was made 
between discretionary and obligatory future advances. Ironically, the 
1962 Code provided that a security interest for an obligatory future 
advance attached at the time the commitment was made.®® This rule. 
encumbrances in deciding whether to acquire a real estate interest. The statutory demonstration 
in the text, however, renders Coogan's reliance on "policy" unnecessary. Accord Leary & Rucci, 
supra note 1, at 384-85. 
These subsequent interests include buyers. Meads v. Dial Fin. Co., 56 Ala. App. 84, 319 
So. 2d 281 (1975); subsequent mortgagees, Tillotson v. Stephens, 195 Neb. 104, 237 N.W.2d 108 
(1975); and the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, who has the status of a hypothetical lien creditor 
under state law as of the day the petition for bankruptcy is filed. In re New Hope & I.R.R., 353 
F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1973). For a discussion of the bankruptcy trustee's status under the 1972 
amendments to the UCC and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA), 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 
V 1981), see infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text. 
U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (1962); see O'Dell v. Kunkel's, Inc., 581 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1978) 
(unperfected security interest in fixtures had no priority over claims of subsequent purchaser 
without knowledge); McCarthy v. Bank, 283 Pa. Super. 328, 423 A.2d 1280 (1980) (unperfected 
security interest in fixtures had priority over interest of subsequent purchaser who had knowl­
edge). 
" In ordinary personal property cases, lien creditors and purchasers could take priority over 
an unperfected security interest only if they were without knowledge of it. Competing secured 
parties did not fall within this rule. Compare U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(a) (1962) (the only part of 
section 9-301(1) with no knowledge requirement) with U.C.C. § 9-312 (1972) (knowledge 
ordinarily plays no part in determining priorities between secured parties). According to Profes­
sor Gilmore, the adoption of a "race only" concept between secured parties came about as the 
result of a drafting accident. See 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 34.2, at 898. 
U.G.C. § 1-201(4) (1962). Commentators were split as to whether discretionary future 
advances related back to attachment of the prior security interest or whether they gave rise to a 
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however, did not govern mortgages, although real estate law had 
analogous rules which allowed relation back to the priority of the 
original mortgage in the case of obligatory advances.®® It was, there­
fore, unclear whether all future advances were to be considered "sub­
sequent" under section 9-313(4) and hcncc not subject to the benefits 
and burdens of sections 9-313(2) or (3), or whether only discretionary 
future advances were covered by section 9-313(4) (c). 
In one leading case. House v. Long,®^ the court read 9-313(4)(c) 
to mean that future advances, whether obligatory or discretionary, 
never related back to the priority of preaffixation advances under the 
mortgage. In that case, a mortgagee had been subordinated under 
section 9-313(2) but was given a new lease on life as to his obligatory 
future advances under section 9-313(4) (c), which were held not to 
relate back to the low priority of the initial mortgage. The court's 
treatment of obligatory future advances was notable on two counts. 
First, it proved that relation back was not always helpful to mortga­
gees. It was helpful only when the mortgagee was senior as to the 
initial part of the mortgage debt. Where the initial part of the mort­
gage debt was junior, as it was in House v. Long, relation back was 
undesirable. Second, in holding that obligatory future advances under 
new and separate security interest when the advance was actually made. Compare R. Henson, 
Handbook of Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code § 5-14, at 101-
02 (1973) ("the distinction in this context between voluntary and obligatory advances [is] 
meaningless") with Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 71 (only future advances that were 
contracted for are protected). The 1972 amendments have adopted the view that discretionary 
advances give rise to separate security interests. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(4), -307(3) (1972). 
The priority of future advances is important whenever the status of the secured party 
depends on perfection. Between secured parties, priority goes to the party who is the first to 
perfect or file. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972). 
G. Osborne, Handbook on the Law of Mortgages § 120 (2d ed. 1970). The rule in a 
majority of jurisdictions is that if a future advance made under a mortgage is "obligatory," it has 
the priority of (i.e. relates back in time to) the original mortgage in which the obligation to lend 
was made. Treatment of "discretionary" future advances varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
In most states, the discretionary advance relates back to the priority of the original mortgage 
unless the mortgagee had actual knowledge of the intervening lien claiming priority over the 
future advance; recordation or "perfection" is not strictly relevant in such states. A minority of 
jurisdictions subordinate the discretionary future advance if the intervening lien is recorded, 
even if the mortgagee had no knowledge of the lien at the time of the advance. The theory here is 
that the mortgagee has "constructive" knowledge of the intervening lien. These jurisdictions, of 
course, make it necessary for mortgagees to check the records before making every new discre­
tionary advance. In a few states, discretionary advances relate back in all circumstances and are 
therefore indistinguishable from obligatory advances. See id. §§ 120-21; Comment, Mortgages 
to Secure Future Advances: Problems of Priority and the Doctrine of Economic Necessity, 46 
Miss. L.J. 433, 434-41 (1975). 
244 Ark. 718, 426 S.W.2d 814 (1968). 
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the mortgage had no relation back feature, the court was ignoring the 
UCC rule that would have applied to personal property security 
interests'® and the real property rule that would have applied to 
mortgages.'® Only where the two bodies of law—each agreeing upon 
the proper position to take—collided and overlapped was a different 
rule created. Arkansas has now passed the 1972 amendments and has 
therefore ended this curious anomaly.''® 
Another problem facing the mortgagee under section 9-313(4) of 
the 1962 Code was his status at a foreclosure sale as a purchaser of the 
property on which he had an encumbrance. 
Neither mortgagees nor lien creditors are allowed to keep the 
land in which they have an interest.^' Mortgage liens and judgment 
liens are real estate interests which secure the payment of debt. The 
encumbered real estate must therefore be sold in order to reduce it to 
money, the language in which the mortgage debt and judgment are 
expressed.''^ When a foreclosure sale occurs, an issue arises as to 
whether the purchaser at the sale should be considered a "subsequent" 
purchaser with priority over unperfected security interests in fixtures 
which attached prior to the sale. Section 9-313(4) expressly addressed 
this issue, giving the subsequent purchaser priority, but it had a 
curious exclusion. Whereas purchasers at foreclosure sales generally 
received protected status afforded subsequent purchasers in other situ­
ations,'" purchasers who were also the mortgagees of the property 
instigating the sale were denied protection. 
U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (1972). 
" See, e.g.. United States v. Westmoreland Manganese Corp., 134 F. Supp 898, 932 (E.D. 
Ark. 1955) (obligatory future advances made pursuant to a construction mortgage have priority 
over intervening mechanic liens), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Latrobe 
Constr. Co., 246 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 355 U.S. 890 (1957); First Nafl Bank v. 
Conway Sheet Metal Co., 244 Ark. 963, 428 S.W.2d 293 (1968) (obligatory future advance has 
priority over intervening materialman's lien). See also Lyman Lamb Co. v. Union Bank, 237 
Ark. 629, 374 S.W.2d 820 (1964) (where advances found to be optional and not obligatory, 
mortgagee's notice of intervening lien caused future advance to be subordinated to that lien). 
Act of Feb. 13, 1973, § 1, 1973 Ark. Acts 345 (codified at Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-9-101 
(Supp. 1981)). The 1972 amendments no longer legislate the priority of future advances under 
mortgages. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74. 
" Cf. Onyx Ref. Co. v. Evans Prod. Corp., 182 F. Supp 253, 256 (N.D. Tex. 1959) ("A 
judgment lien does not create any right of property or interest in the lands upon which it is a lien. 
It gives the right to foreclosure, either by execution or independent suit, which, when done, will 
relate back so as to exclude adverse interests subsequent to the fixing of the lien."). 
Cf. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1972) (secured party may keep the collateral on default if the 
debtor or junior secured parties do not object). 
" See Architectural Cabinet, Inc. v. Manley, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 263 (Pa. C.P. 
1966); 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 28.7, at 773 n.6. 
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This exclusion was borrowed, apparently without much thought, 
from the case law under the UCSA.^^ In choosing such a rule, the 
drafters of the original section 9-313 ignored the debate as to whether 
such purchasers deserved the protection of the recording statutes. A 
respectable vein of opinion thought they did deserve it, since protec­
tion of ignorant mortgagees who purchased at their own foreclosure 
sales would help make those sales more efficient and thus help make 
real estate financing a more desirable lending device. The contrary 
view was that recording statutes were designed solely to keep the 
ordinary course of business running smoothly. Foreclosure sales were 
not in the ordinary course of business and, therefore, recording stat­
utes should never protect purchasers at such sales, especially not the 
very mortgagee or lien creditor who sponsored the foreclosure sale. 
Such a creditor-purchaser, after all, did not part with money but 
merely offset the debt owed to him.^® 
The importance of preventing mortgagees at their own sales from 
being protected against subsequent purchasers under section 9-313(4) 
should not be overestimated. It was a very narrowly drawn provision 
that adversely affected only junior encumbrances. Senior mortgagees 
presumably have the power under nonuniform real estate law to 
foreclose competing junior liens and security interests by their foreclo­
sure sale.^® If such a power exists, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale 
took the land free of any foreclosed lien, regardless of his knowledge of 
these liens. Purchaser protection under section 9-313(4) was therefore 
irrelevant when a senior encumbrance was foreclosed; denial of it to 
senior mortgagees who purchased at their own foreclosure sale was, 
therefore, also quite beside the point. Even among junior mortgagees, 
the exclusion had less than universal application. If the mortgagee was 
junior under section 9-313(2)—because the collateral was already 
encumbered with a security interest at the time of affixation—the 
narrow exclusion did apply, so that the junior mortgagee was not 
permitted to bootstrap himself up to senior "purchaser" status by 
" E.g., Keil Motor Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 43 Del. 322, 47 A.2d 164 (Super. Ct. 
1941). 
For an exeellent discussion of these issues, see Pugh v. Highley, 152 Ind. 252, 53 N.E. 171 
(1899). 
E.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1352 (MeKinney 1979). One unanswered question is 
the extent to which nonuniform law can destroy Article 9 security interests in light of section 9-
201, which states, "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is effective . . . 
against purchasers of the collateral." U.C.C. § 9-201 (1972) (emphasis added). The author 
intends to explore this conundrum in a separate article on lien foreclosure in general. 
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purchasing at his own foreclosure sale. Even if he had the requisite 
ignorance at the time of the purchase, the mortgagee was to remain 
junior. But as to mortgagees who were junior by virtue of section 9-
313(4)—because they obtained their mortgage with knowledge after 
affixation and attachment of a still unperfected security interest—the 
exclusion was irrelevant. Their knowledge would have kept them 
from being senior purchasers, even without the exelusion in ques­
tion.'*''' 
One complexity that existed before the 1972 amendments related 
to mortgagees who took by assignment from a previous mortgagee. A 
technical reading of section 9-313(4) (a) indicates that the assignment 
of the mortgage made the successor mortgagee a "subsequent pur­
chaser."*® A mortgage that had been senior in the hands of the as­
signor became junior in the hands of the assignee if, between the 
creation of the mortgage and its assignment, the assignee obtained 
knowledge of the unperfected security interest in fixtures or if the 
secured party properly perfected his interest. Conversely, a junior 
mortgage (under section 9-313(2)) became senior in the hands of an 
assignee without knowledge of an unperfected security interest. 
Again, once the mortgagee established senior status, he could buy 
freely at his own foreclosure sale, since nonuniform foreclosure law 
destroys all junior liens, regardless of the purchaser's knowledge. Or­
dinarily, one would have expeeted that the assignee took the exaet 
status of his assignor, an expectation that the 1972 amendments have 
effectuated.'*® 
11. The 1972 Amendments 
In response to the avalanche of criticism of and commentary on 
the 1962 version of section 9-313, the 1972 amendments to seetion 9-
•''' The narrow exclusion under discussion also did not apply where the mortgagee was junior 
under section 9-313(2), where the fixture interest was later perfected, and where the junior 
mortgagee purchased at his own sale. In such a case, no purchaser at the sale would have been 
protected, so that the exclusion of the mortgagee-purchaser was irrelevant. 
"The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take priority over (a) a 
subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate . . . U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a) 
(1962) (emphasis added). 
See infra text accompanying notes 91-96. 
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313®® incorporated eight major initiatives, one of which merely clari­
fied preexisting law.®' 
The official text of the 1972 amendments to Section 9-313 is as follows; 
(1) In this section and in the provisions of Part 4 of this Article referring to 
fixture filing, unless the context otherwise requires 
(a) goods are "fixtures" when they become so related to particular real 
estate that an interest in them arises under real estate law — 
(b) a "fixture filing" is the filing in the office where a mortgage on the real 
estate would be filed or recorded of a financing statement covering goods which are 
or are to become fixtures and conforming to the requirements of subsection (5) of 
Section 9-402 — 
(c) a mortgage is a "construction mortgage" to the extent that it secures an 
obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land including the 
acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded writing so indicates. — 
(2) A security interest under this Article may be created in goods which are 
fixtures or may continue in goods which become fixtures, but no security interest 
exists under this Article in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improve­
ment on land. 
(3) This Article does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures 
pursuant to real estate law. 
(4) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting 
interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where 
(a) the security interest is a purchase money security interest, the interest of 
the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the security 
interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within ten 
days thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in 
possession of the real estate; or — 
(b) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of 
the encumbrancer or owner is of record, the security interest has priority over any 
conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the 
debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate; 
or — 
(c) the fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines or readily 
removable replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods, and 
before the goods become fixtures the security interest is perfected by any method 
permitted by this Article; or — 
(d) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by legal or 
equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any method per­
mitted by this Article. — 
(5) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over the 
conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where 
(a) the encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the security 
interest or has disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or — 
(b) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer 
or owner. If the debtor's right terminates, the priority of the security interest 
continues for a reasonable time. — 
(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise subject to 
subsections (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction 
mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods become fixtures 
before the completion of the construction. To the extent that it is given to refinance a 
construction mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to the same extent as the 
construction mortgage. 
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The first and most imperative of the initiatives may also be (so 
far) the least successful. The initiative was designed to eliminate the 
need to elect between a fixture filing (not effective to perfect a nonfix-
ture interest) and an ordinary UCC filing (not effective to perfect 
fixture interests) which existed under the 1962 Code. This system 
posed a bankruptcy risk, since the trustee could avoid the security 
interest in fixtures when the secured party relied upon the wrong kind 
of filing.®^ 
Professor Kripke, a principal drafter of the amendments to sec­
tion 9-313,®^ introduced the notion that "perfection" need not imply 
the establishment of priority over every possible claimant. He thought 
that an ordinary UCC filing should be sufficient to "perfect" against 
lien creditors and hence against bankruptcy trustees (claimants who 
would not be expected to search real estate records). If priority over 
real estate purchasers and mortgagees were desired, a more compli­
cated fixture filing, designed to give notice to real estate title search­
ers, should be made.®^ As a result of this thinking, the 1972 amend­
ment to section 9-313 requires only "perfec[tion] by any method" to 
gain priority over subsequent lien creditors.®® Since bankruptcy trust­
ees were deemed "subsequent lien creditors,"®® it was hoped®'' that 
(7) In cases not within the preceding subsections, a security interest in fixtures is 
subordinate to the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related 
real estate who is not the debtor. 
(8) When the secured party has priority over all owners and encumbrancers of 
the real estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his 
collateral from the real estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of 
the real estate who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of 
repair of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate 
caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing them. A 
person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured 
party gives adequate security for the performance of this obligation. 
U.C.C. § 9-313 (1972). 
" See infra text accompanying notes 97-101. 
See supra text accompanying notes 9-14. 
Henson, Fixtures; A Commentary on the Officially Proposed Changes in Article 9, 52 
Marq. L. Rev. 179, 181 n.ll (1968). 
^ Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 59-60. 
55 U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(d) (1972). 
55 Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act), § 70(c) (1976) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. V 1981)). The BRA provision stipulates that the trustee is a 
hypothetical lien creditor on the day of the bankruptcy petition. Section 70(c) was more vague as 
to the time limitations on the trustee's hypothetical lien creditor power, but the Supreme Court 
construed the statute to limit lien creditor status as of the day of bankruptcy. Lewis v. Manufac­
turers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961). 
5' See Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-8. ("It is hoped that since the fixture 
security interest arises against the goods in their capacity as chattels, the bankruptcy courts will 
apply the judgment creditor test."). 
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this requirement would preserve the secured fixture interest against 
invalidation in bankruptcy. 
The effect of the 1972 amendments under the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898 (1898 Act) had been extremely doubtful. Under section 70(c)— 
the so-called strong arm statute—the bankruptcy trustee might have 
been a mere hypothetical lien creditor on the day of bankruptcy (and 
hence could be defeated by an ordinary UCC filing), but he also had a 
different and more potent power under section 60, the preference 
statute. One of the aims of preference law—aside from guaranteeing 
that creditors cannot raid the debtor's estate on the eve of bank­
ruptcy—was the persecution of the secret lien.®® This, of course, is 
really a fraudulent conveyance idea; but from earliest times, section 
60 tried to obliterate the secret lien by deeming that a transfer of the 
debtor's personal property occurred only when it was so far perfected 
as to have priority over a subsequent lien creditor. Such a rule tended 
to transform contemporaneous transfers of property (which are not 
preferences) into transfers in satisfaction of antecedent debt.®® Not­
withstanding Professor Kripke's suggested reform of section 9-313, a 
fixture interest perfected only by a UCC filing was a voidable prefer­
ence in bankruptcy because a transfer of "real estate" had to be 
perfected against a bona fide purchaser of real estate. A fixture inter­
est protected against a subsequent lien creditor, therefore, was still a 
"secret lien" as far as section 60 was concerned, because fixtures are 
real estate,®" and only a fixture filing could perfect the interest against 
a hypothetical subsequent bona fide purchaser of real estate.®' 
The drafters of the Bankruptcy Reform Act (BRA) recognized 
this problem and attempted to supplement the 1972 amendments to 
section 9-313 with language that would preserve fixture interests per­
fected by an ordinary UCC filing. They did so by specifying that 
fixtures should be considered personal property, rather than real es­
tate, and that only the lien creditor test could be used to challenge an 
Article 9 security interest in fixtures.®^ Unfortunately, Congress lost 
sight of the fixture problem when it redrafted the trustee's strong-arm 
power. Under section 70(c), the trustee had always been a hypotheti­
cal lien creditor on the day of bankruptcy; under section 544(a), he 
See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 13, § 24-4, at 999. 
See Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests as Voidable Preferences, 3 Cardozo L. Rev. 
357, 372-78 (1982). 
U.C.C. § 9-313(l)(a) (1972). 
Breitowitz, supra note 59, at 384-87. 
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981). 
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also became a hypothetical purchaser of real estate on the day of 
bankruptcy." In drafting section 544(a), Congress forgot that fixtures 
are real estate and that an ordinary UCC filing by a secured party 
would not perfect a fixture interest against a hypothetical purchaser of 
real estate.®" The characterization of fixtures as personal property in 
section 547 was for purposes of preference law only, and not for 
purposes of seetion 544. 
This drafting error was spotted soon after the BRA became law, 
and Congress is already pondering a technical amendment to section 
544(a) to make clear that fixtures are to be considered personal prop­
erty.®® The amendment, however, has not passed Congress as of the 
date of this Article's publication. Thus, despite twenty years of regret 
that a secured party must, at his peril, "elect" to make a fixture filing 
or a regular UCC filing, that eleetion must still be made.®® 
There is a further bankruptcy risk aside from the failure of 
Congress to coordinate section 544(a) with the 1972 amendments. 
Whereas affixed collateral is saved from lien creditors by an ordinary 
UCC filing, unaffixed collateral is not necessarily saved by a fixture 
filing.®^ A fixture lender who chooses to make only a fixture filing may 
» Id. § 544(a)(3). 
See, e.g.. In re Boots Builders Inc., II Bankr. 635, 639 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In Boots, the 
defendant installed air conditioners on the bankrupt's real estate. After the plaintiff filed for 
bankruptcy, the defendant quickly filed notice of a materialman's lien on the air conditioners. 
Under Texas lien law, the filing established the lien's priority over any judicial lien intervening 
between installation of the air conditioners and the filing. Thus, the hypothetical lien creditor m 
bankruptcy was beaten. See II U.S.C. § 546(b)(Supp. V 1981). The filing, however, had only a 
prospective effect with regard to bona fide purchasers of real estate. Therefore, the bankruptcy 
court ruled that, as of the day of bankruptcy, the fixture interest was unperfected against a 
hypothetical bona fide purchaser of real estate under section 544(a)(3), and was therefore void^ 
The Bankruptcy Technical Amendments Act, first introduced in 1979, proposes to amend 
section 544(a)(3) of the BRA by excepting fixtures from the real estate category therein. S. 658, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 23,513-320 (1979). The same act was proposed by the 97th 
Congress, H.R. 3705, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. H2437 (I98I), and will presumably 
be reintroduced during the 98th Congress. 
Of course, no such bankruptcy risk exists if the collateral falls within the narrow category 
of readily removable machines and replacements of consumer appliances. U.C.C. § 9-3I3(4)(c) 
(1972); see infra text aceompanying notes 112-18. 
Even with regard to ordinary fixture collateral, the secured party has moved forward from 
his position under the 1898 Act. Under section 60, the deadline for making a fixture filing was 
the latest of either the debtor's insolvency, the secured party's knowledge or reason to know of 
the debtor's insolvency, or the start of the four month preference period. If the fixture filing was 
made thereafter, the fixture interest became a voidable preference. Under the BRA, the absence 
of a fixture filing is irrelevant to preference liability. The deadline for the fixture filing has 
therefore been moved back by section 544(a)(3) to the date of the bankruptcy petition. 
Of course the "right place" for unaffixed collateral under section 9-401(1) might coinci-
dentally be the "right place" for affixed collateral as well. In that case there would be no risk 
from the debtor's failure to affix prior to bankruptcy. See supra note II. 
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have an unperfected security interest until the collateral is affixed to 
the land described in the financing statement. The secured party, 
therefore, takes a risk that bankruptcy may occur before affixation.®® 
The second and "weightiest"®® initiative of the 1972 amendments 
gives superpriority to construction mortgagees. In this type of transac­
tion, the mortgagee lends the money actually used to buy the personal 
property that later becomes fixtures. Under the 1962 Code, a con­
struction mortgage was treated in the same manner as any other prior 
mortgage.''® Any security interest, perfected or not, had priority over 
the construction mortgage, provided that attachment preceded affix­
ation. Thus, a construction mortgagee could supply the purchase 
money for personal property intended for affixation to the real estate, 
only to have that personal property become the collateral for a non-
purchase money lender who gave a second loan.''' Today, the con­
struction mortgagee cannot be subordinated to a second lender while 
construction of the building is ongoing.''^ 
With the superpriority given to construction mortgagees, the 
Review Committee supposed it solved a second problem under the 
1962 Code—the priority accorded to future advances under the real 
estate mortgage. Whereas the 1962 version of section 9-313(4) (c) spe­
cifically stated that future advances under a prior mortgage were to 
be treated as "subsequent" mortgage debt, the current version of 
section 9-313 is silent on this point. But construction mortgagees are 
not the only mortgagees who give future advances. Ordinary mortga­
gees might also do so.'® Thus, priority conflicts involving future ad-
See Adams, supra note 1, at 914. 
Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-17. 
™ E.g., House V. Long, 244 Ark.'718, 426 S.W.2d 814 (1968). 
" See Coogan, supra note 16, at 498-99. 
U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972). The superpriority is limited to fixtures that are installed after 
the construction mortgage is recorded and that are not readily removable—i.e., collateral 
covered by section 9-313(4)(a). Section 9-313(6) specifically contemplates that fixture security 
interests perfected by a fixture filing before the construction mortgage is recorded, U.C.C. § 9-
313(4)(b), and readily removable collateral of the sort covered by section 9-313(4)(c) not be 
subject to the construction mortgagee's superpriority. The rationale behind section 9-313(4)(c) is 
that readily removable office machines and consumer goods are not related to construction of the 
building. See Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-9; Coogan, supra note 16, at 498-99. 
" See Adams, supra note 1, at 925. Professor Adams has discovered an inconsistency with 
regard to future advances given by a mortgagee who is junior under section 9-313(4)(a). 
Logically, such a mortgagee can never be a construction mortgagee; otherwise, he would be 
senior under section 9-313(6). If the advance under the mortgage is discretionary, it would not 
relate back to the junior status of the underlying mortgage under the law of most states. 
Therefore, the advance would be considered a "new" subsequent mortgage, which is governed 
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vances under a nonconstruction mortgage remains unresolved. The 
better view is probably to treat future advances as they would be 
treated under real estate law. Thus, obligatory advances would relate 
back to the time when the commitment was actually given, whereas 
discretionary advances might or might not.'''* 
In a third initiative, knowledge of the real estate claimant has 
been made irrelevant to priorites under section 9-313. The 1962 Code 
had been in part a "race-notice" statute. While a secured party's 
knowledge was rarely material to his priority,^® the knowledge of lien 
creditors and those buyers not protected by section 9-307(1) could 
subordinate them to unperfected security interests.''® The 1972 amend­
ments generally eliminated knowledge as a disability for lien creditors 
in section 9-301(1)(b)'" (though not for buyers)''® as well as for priori­
ties governed by section 9-313. Today, section 9-313 is entirely a 
"race" statute and has no "notice" features.™ 
The fourth initiative instituted by the Review Committee has 
removed the possibility of a secured party having priority over an 
earlier real estate interest unless the security interest has been per­
fected. Today, in order for a secured party to prevail over a mortga­
gee whose interest arose earlier in time, he must file a fixture filing 
under section 9-313(4)(a) within ten days of affixation of the collateral 
to the real estate. Furthermore, if the collateral is "readily removable" 
within the meaning of section 9-313(4) (c), the secured party can 
prevail only if he perfects (by any means permitted by the Article) 
under section 9-313(4)(b). There, we learn that the mortgage is senior to the perfected fixture 
interest, because the mortgage was "of record" before the fixture filing was made. See Adams, 
supra note 1, at 924-25. It is patently unjust that a mortgagee should be able to give a 
discretionary advance with priority over a previously perfected fixture interest. In such a case, 
the priority of the advance should be equated with the junior status of the underlying mortgage. 
Section 9-3I3(4)(b) has been justly criticized by Professor Adams on this point. 
See supra note 36. 
" But see U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1972). 
Id. §§ 9-301(1), -307(2) (1962). Section 9-307(1), of course, is the all-important rule that 
"buyer[s] in [the] ordinary course of business" of anything except farm products take free of even 
perfected security interests, "even though the buyer knows of its existence." The statement about 
buyers in the text ignores certain complexities, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-308 (purchasers of chattel paper 
and instruments), heyond the scope of this article. 
•" Id. § 9-301. See Review Committee, supra note 16, paras. E-46 to -47. 
U.C.C. § 9-30I(c)-(d) (1972). 
™ Again, this may be subject to the rule protecting secured parties who filed in the wrong 
place from competitors with knowledge of the contents of the financing statement. Id. § 9-
401(2). See infra text aceompanying notes 150-60. 
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prior to affixation. No ten day grace period exists under section 9-
313(4) (c).«" 
With the fifth initiative, the drafters eliminated what they per­
ceived to be a real estate owner's vulnerability to unscrupulous gen­
eral contractors. Revised subsections 9-313(4)(a) and (b) protect the 
secured party only where the debtor "has an interest of record" in the 
real estate or has possession of the real estate. Under the old version of 
the Code, commentators feared that a general contractor could buy 
inventory subject to a supplier's security interest; it could even have 
been the case that the supplier's security interest in the contractor's 
inventory was unperfected. Since the security interest had attached 
prior to affixation of the inventory to the real estate, the security 
interest was senior to the interests of any prior real estate party. Thus 
a real estate owner wishing to install new plumbing could have found 
that the plumbing, once installed, was subject to a security interest for 
a debt the real estate owner did not even owe.®' This danger may have 
been somewhat exaggerated, since, under section 9-307(1), the real 
estate owner who bought the plumbing would take it free of any 
security interest created "by his seller" (i.e., the contractor), provided 
that the sale had been in the ordinary course of the seller's business.®^ 
It is difficult to imagine many circumstances in which section 9-307(1) 
would not have protected the real estate owner, but presumably, the 
outside chance that this scenario could occur was enough to prompt 
the drafting of some protection for the real estate owner in section 9-
313.®® Under the 1972 version, at least with regard to fixtures that are 
not readily removable, office machines or consumer appliances, the 
debtor must have "an interest of record in the real estate or [be] in 
Of course, the grace period under section 9-313(4) (a) does apply to "readily removable" 
collateral covered by section 9-313(4)(c), if the secured party chooses to file a fixture filing. The 
interaction between these two sections will be developed in more detail below. See infra text 
accompanying notes 105-19. 
Kripke, Review Committee, supra note 1, at 311. See Review Committee, supra note 16, 
para. A-14. 
U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972). Any supplies in the possession of a general contractor would 
seem to be covered by section 9-307(1), provided only that the contractor is a "person in the 
business of selling goods of that kind" within the meaning of section 1-201(9); see also U.C.C. § 
9-109(4) (1972) (goods are inventory "if they are . . . to be furnished under contracts of service or 
if be has so furnished them"). If the contractor so qualifies, the owner of the real estate is a 
"buyer in [the] ordinary course of business" within the meaning of section 9-307(1). 
Professor Kripke considered and—on inadequate grounds—rejected the use of section 9-
307(1) to prevent contractor fraud. See Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 70 ("[Tjbis line of 
analysis probably will not work under the present Code, because a building contract is not a 
contract for the sale of goods and, tbereforey the owner is not a buyer in the ordinary course 
under Section 1-201(9); thus, the protection afforded by Section 9-307(1) does not apply."). A 
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possession of the real estate" before the secured party can gain prior­
ity.®^ Of course, the secured lender continues to have the option of 
obtaining the real estate owner's consent to priority; subordination 
agreements in such cases have always been expressly approved by the 
ucc.®® 
Unfortunately, the drafting job, intended to thwart unscrupulous 
contractors, was less than complete. First, the debtor need not have 
an interest in real estate in the case of collateral covered by section 9-
313(4)(c)—"readily removable" machines and appliances. Since these 
items will tend to be a large percentage of fixture transactions, a 
major loophole has been left. On the other hand, we may safely rely 
on section 9-307(1) to destroy the supplier's security interest, so that 
contractor's fraud is a most unlikely. 
Second, the drafters overlooked the fact that the contractor will 
often have a statutory lien to cover the supply of fixtures to an owner 
of real estate.®® If so, the debtor (i.e., the contractor) will have an 
"interest of record in real estate" (the statutory lien).®^ Section 9-
313(4) (a) makes clear that the fixture interest of the supplier takes 
priority over the unwitting home owner whenever the contractor had 
a recorded statutory lien. Again, section 9-307(1) renders this loophole 
irrelevant or at least unimportant. 
construction contract may well be outside the scope of Article 2, as Professor Kripke suggests, but 
section 9-307(1) does not require Article 2 coverage of the sale. It requires only that the buyer be 
in tbe ordinary course of business, which, through section 1-201(9), requires that the contractor 
be a seller of "goods of that kind" (emphasis added). See U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h) (1972) (fixtures are 
goods). Even if the basic terms of the construction contract do not fall under Article 2, it does not 
follow that security interests on goods which become fixtures cannot be terminated under section 
9-307(1). Tbis is especially so since application of section 9-307(1) serves tbe policy of preventing 
contractor's fraud. 
Nevertheless, authors have never used section 9-307(1) as the answer to contractor's fraud 
and have assumed that it remained an important problem under the 1962 Code. See, e.g., 
Adams, supra note 1, at 866; Gordon, Credit Sales of Installed Equipment Financing—The 
Uniform Commericial Code's Uneasy Truce Between Realty and Chattel Financing Interests, 64 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 651, 670 (1970). 
" U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a)-(b) (1972). 
« Id. §§ 9-313(5)(a), -316. 
For example, in Texas, a statutory lien arises whenever a contractor supplies fixtures. The 
lien arises at the time an agreement is recorded or work commences, whichever is earlier. Tex. 
Civ. Code Ann. § 5459(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982). 
U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a)-(b) (1972). The words "of record" will prevent the unfiled statutory 
lien from sufficing for this theoretical contractor's fraud. Texas requires that a filing be made by 
a contractor not later tban 120 days after tbe "indebtedness accrues." The lienor must notify the 
debtor and must swear out an affidavit claiming the lien and the notice to the debtor. Id. § 5453. 
Tex. Civ. Code Ann. § 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1982). 
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The sixth initiative deals with automatic perfection without filing 
for purchase money security interests in consumer goods. Under the 
1962 Code, the automatic perfection rule for purchase money security 
interests was unavailable for personal property which became fix­
tures. These interests had to be perfected by a fixture filing.®® A 
purchase money lender for consumer goods, therefore, faced the same 
election dilemma as did his nonpurchase money brethren. In 1972 the 
rule was changed.®® An automatically perfected interest in consumer 
goods will survive affixation. This form of perfection is not good as 
against all real estate parties, however, and there are circumstances in 
which fixture filings are still required for priority.®® 
The seventh initiative centered around the fact that assignment 
of a mortgage could reverse the priority that the mortgage originally 
had; junior mortgages could become senior in the hands of an assignee 
who was ignorant of an intervening unperfected security interests®', 
and senior mortages could become junior in the hands of an assignee 
with knowledge of the intervening unperfected fixture interest (or an 
assignee without knowledge, if the secured party simply perfected his 
interest with a fixture filing).®^ This reversal of priorities occurred 
because an assignee of a mortgage fit within the black letter of section 
9-313(4) (a) of the 1962 Code as a "subsequent purchaser for value of 
any interest in the real estate." This reversal is justifiable in the case of 
a junior mortgage that is assigned and becomes senior in the hands of 
the assignee. In such a case, the fixture lender will have failed to 
perfect and therefore deserves his fate. Likewise, the case of a senior 
mortgage, which becomes junior in the hands of an assignee is not 
unfair (from the perspective of the assignee) because the assignee 
could have protected himself by checking the records (where perfec­
tion has occurred) or because the assignee took the mortgage in spite 
of his knowledge of an unperfected fixture interest. The reversal was. 
U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(d) (1962). 
Id. § 9-302(l)(d) (1972). 
Automatic perfection will suffice only when the secured party is able to claim priority 
under section 9-313(4)(c) because his collateral is readily removable office machines or replace­
ments for consumer appliances, or when the competing real estate claimant is a subsequent lien 
creditor under section 9-313(4)(d). 
" In such a case, the assignor's encumbrance could be junior either under old section 9-
313(2) (attachment-affixation cases) or under section 9-313(4) (a) or (c) (encumbrance taken or 
advances made with knowledge of an unperfected security interest in fixtures). 
In this case, the assignor's mortgage could be senior either under old section 9-313(3) 
(affixation-attachment cases) or under section 9-313(4) (encumbrance subsequently created with­
out the encumbrancer's knowledge of an unperfected security interest). 
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however, unfair to the senior mortgagee. Although the mortgage 
remained senior in the case where the mortgagee himself foreclosed, 
the mortgage was less valuable in the mortgage resale market in light 
of the reversal of priorities.®^ The 1962 version of section 9-313 thus 
lacked a "shelter" concept, whereby a senior mortgagee could also 
convey senior status to a prospective assignee, regardless of interven­
ing perfection of the security interest or the assignee's knowledge.®^ In 
contrast, the 1962 Code did provide a shelter provision to protect 
assignees of fixture security interests.®® 
The potential for senior mortgages to be subordinated to fixture 
interests upon assignment has been obviated by a change in the lan­
guage of 9-313(4)(b) which gives the secured party priority over subse­
quent purchasers only when "the security interest has priority over 
any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer 
or owner." This language incorporates the "shelter" concept that the 
1962 version clearly lacked.®® 
Marketability of mortgage debt takes on added significance in light of the active trading 
which has arisen in recent years in "Ginnie Maes (mortgage-backed bonds guaranteed by the 
Government National Mortgage Association) and other securities. See, e.g., Note, Security 
Interests in Notes and Mortgages; Determining the Applicable Law, 79 Golum. L. Rev. 1414, 
1415 (1979). 
Cf. U.C.C. § 3-201(1) (1972) (shelter provision for holders of negotiable instruments). 
Id. § 9-302(2) (1962). 
The 1972 amendments prevent the deterioration of a mortgage's priority because of 
assignment, but they do not necessarily eliminate the possibility that a (potentially) junior 
mortgage could become senior as a result of an assignment. Under section 9-313(4) (a) of the 1972 
Code, a mortgage is potentially junior for 10 days after affixation. If a fixture filing is made 
within these 10 days, the mortgage becomes permanently junior, and there is no way this status 
could be changed by assignment. But if the potentially junior mortgage is assigned before 
perfection during the 10 days following affixation, it becomes senior in the hands of the assignee, 
provided the assignee records his new interest before a fixture filing is made. If the assignee of the 
mortgage does file first, he is "of record" prior to perfection of the security interest within the 
meaning of section 9-313(4) (b). Roughly speaking, this establishes a grace period similar to that 
in section 9-301(2), where lien creditors and bulk purchasers are made subject to the grace 
period, but other kinds of buyers are not, U.G.C. § 9-301(l)(c)-(d) (1972). 
The "no-shelter" idea when the mortgage is potentially junior under section 9-313(4)(a) is 
not analogous to section 9-301(2) in this regard; If a lien creditor were to assign his lien during 
the grace period, the assignee would also be subject to the grace period, because the assignee's 
rights would "arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing." Id. § 9-
301(2). But under section 9-313(4)(a), the encumbrancer's rights must arise "before" affixation of 
the collateral. Assignees who take their rights between affixation and the filing seem to be 
covered only by section 9-313(4)(b), where they have a chance to improve the position held by 
the assignor, who was potentially junior. 
Another curiosity with regard to assigned real estate interests is the assigned judicial lien. 
These liens are covered by section 9-313(4)(a). If they arise before affixation of the collateral they 
can be defeated only by a fixture filing within 10 days of affixation. If such a lien were to be 
assigned during the grace period, the lien's priority would be governed not by section 9-
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The eighth initiative in the 1972 amendments is not really a 
change in the law, but is more in the nature of a clarification which 
the drafters thought important enough to emphasize with some ex­
plicit statutory language.®^ This final initiative relates to "trade fix­
tures," a term of art referring to fixtures installed by tenants, typically 
to equip their places of business. For example, stools in a diner might 
qualify as fixtures in some states because they are bolted or cemented 
to the floor. The law of most states, however, is that "trade fixtures" 
are presumptively removable by the tenant.®® At the end of the lease 
term, the tenant, not the landlord, keeps the stools.®® 
Under the 1962 Code the landlord never had an interest in this 
type of fixture. When the landlord sold his reversionary interest in the 
313(4)(b), which contains the shelter provision described in tbe text, but by section 9-313(4)(d). 
Under section 9-313(4)(d), a subsequent lien creditor can be beaten by any sort of UCC 
perfection, including automatic perfection of purchase money security interests in consumer 
goods. Thus, if no shelter provision exists in section 9-313(4)(d), the assignee of a judicial lien has 
a special vulnerability tbat assignees of mortgages do not bave. 
There is a way to construct a shelter idea out of section 9-313(4)(d). That provision governs 
liens "obtained by legal or equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected." A lien 
obtained by assignment is therefore not covered by section 9-313(4) (d). A court is thus free to 
decide the lien assignee's priority under section 9-313(4){a), where a fixture filing within 10 days 
of affixation is required for the secured party to prevail. 
" See Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-15. 
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1019 (West 1982); Van Ness v. Packard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 
(1829); see also Poole's Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 320 (K.H. 1703). See generally Note, Trade Fixture— 
Secured Transactions Under New York's Uniform Commercial Code, 44 Alb. L. Rev. 165 (1979). 
Of course, the landlord may obtain a statutory lien for rent on the debtor's personal 
property, and the priority of this lien is another question altogether. Section 9-104(b) states that a 
landlord's lien for rent is not governed by Article 9, and some courts have interpreted this to 
mean that pre-UCC nonuniform law might give absolute priority to the landlord. See, e.g.. In re 
Einhorn Bros., 171 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff d, 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959). If pre-UCC 
law is used, sometimes the landlord takes priority over conflicting UCC security interests and 
sometimes he does not. See Johnson, The Landlord's Lien, the Conditional Sales Contract, and 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Ala. Law. 395 (1968); Leary & Rucci, supra note 1, at 388-
89; Lee, Liens on Personal Property Not Governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, 44 N. 
C.L. Rev. 322, 351-55 (1966). Also, some courts have ruled that landlord's liens obtain the 
superpriority of section 9-310, while others have held that landlords obtain only the lien creditor 
priority under section 9-301. These matters, as well as Alabama's recent nonuniform legislation 
on the priority of landlord's liens, are expertly handled in Comment, Amendment to Section 9-
310 of the Alabama Uniform Commercial Code; Priorities Between an Article 9 Security Interest 
and a Statutory Landlord's Lien, 13 Cum. L. Rev. 97 (1982). 
Charles Dickens had cause to consider the priority between a landlord's lien for rent and a 
conditional vendor's security interest in the tenant's personal property. He would have favored 
the rule of section 9-313(5)(b) even in spite of the presence of a landlord's lien. C. Dickens, Bleak 
House, ch. 18 (" 'The oddity of the thing is', said Mr. Skimpole with a quickened sense of the 
ludicrous, 'that my chairs and tables were not paid for, and yet my landlord walks off with them 
as composedly as possible. Now, tbat seems drolll There's something grotesque in it. The chair 
and table merchant never engaged to pay my landlord my rent. Why should my landlord quarrel 
with him?' "). 
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premises, or when they were seized by his creditor, the purchaser or 
lien creditor never obtained the trade fixtures.'"" It was, therefore, 
impossible for such real estate parties to take priority over the tenant's 
creditor who had a security interest in the trade fixtures. The Review 
Committee apparently thought that the danger of some court missing 
this point was sufficiently great that it specifically added section 9-
313(5) (b). Under this subsection, the secured party has priority over 
the landlord or the landlord's assignees, whether or not the security 
interest has been perfected. This provision is not an exception to the 
mandate of section 9-313(4) (a)—that prior real estate interests cannot 
be subordinated to unperfected security interests. Rather, it is simply 
a restatement of the obvious principle that the landlord has no interest 
whatsoever in trade fixtures and thus perfection, as to him, is irrele­
vant.'"' 
Another theme might be mentioned which cannot properly be 
termed an "initiative" since it is not clear whether the reform was 
intended or not. The 1972 amendments solve the riddle posed by an 
unperfected real estate mortgage. Under the 1962 Code, an earlier 
unrecorded mortgage might still have prevailed over a security inter­
est in an "affixation-then-attachment" case.'"^ On the other hand, an 
"In considering fixture priority problems, there will always first be a preliminary question 
whether real estate interests per se have an interest in the goods as part of the real estate. If not, it 
is immaterial, so far as concerns the real estate parties, as such, whether a chattel security 
interest is perfected or unperfected." Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-6. 
"" It is not inevitable that the tenant may remove trade fixtures at the end of the term. In 
Federal Sign & Signal Corp. v. Berry, 601 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), the landlord 
leased land to a tenant on the condition that any fixtures added by the tenant became the 
landlord's property after the lease terminated. A signmaker "leased" some signs to the tenant 
who affixed them to the land. As so often happens, the signmaker found himself to be an 
unperfected secured party, not a lessor. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972). Since the secured party 
made no filing, let alone a fixture filing, the landlord's "after-acquired property" interest took 
priority over the security interest. Section 9-313(5) (b) was of no avail to the unperfected secured 
party here. 
It should be noted that the stated rationale of the court in Berry is quite different from the 
above analysis. The court reasoned that the unperfected security interest had been foreclosed 
when the landlord sued to foreclose his statutory lien against the tenant's personal property. This 
analysis is demonstrably wrong. A Texas landlord does indeed have a lien on a tenant's personal 
property to secure payment of rent, but here the landlord's interest was a consensual grant by the 
tenant, not a statutory lien. The landlord was not enforcing a statutory lien but was merely 
seeking a "judgment for restitution of the premises" after termination of the lease. See Tex. Civ. 
Proc. Rules Ann. R. 748, 751-55 (Vernon 1979). The better analysis is that the landlord was a 
senior real estate claimant because the secured party failed to make a fixture filing within 10 days 
of affixation, as required by section 9-313(4)(a). 
Adams, supra note 1, at 902. The only reference in the 1962 version of section 9-313(4) to 
recordation of the real estate interest was that a future advance was entitled to priority over an 
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Article 9 fixture lender seemed to qualify as a subsequent bona fide 
purchaser of real estate under most recording statutes. These were 
competing priority schemes, each awarding priority to different par­
ties. A choice between the conflicting systems might therefore have 
been required under the 1962 version. The 1972 amendments solve the 
conundrum. Under section 9-313(4)(b), a secured party who perfects 
before a mortgage is "of record" always prevails. Today there is a pure 
race between mortgagees and secured parties to record or perfect their 
respective claims. 
III. Priorities Under the 1972 Amendments 
The structure of section 9-313 today is such that secured parties 
lose automatically unless they can find a rule that supports their 
priority under subsection (4).^°® Even if they do find such a rule, 
secured parties may still lose if the real estate claimant against whom 
they are competing is a construction mortgagee (or his assignee) and 
construction is going on at the time of affixation.'"^ 
For purposes of comparison with the 1962 Code, it will again be 
helpful to examine the priorities that arise from the six possible pat­
terns of temporal order between attachment, affixation and accrual of 
the real estate interest (which, for convenience, will again be provi­
sionally identified as a mortgage). 
A. Case One: Mortgage-Attachment-Affixation Under 
Sections 9-313(4)(a)-(c) 
This first case, so simple under the 1962 version of the Code, has 
now become monstrously complex. The basic structure of the relevant 
priority sections is such that section 9-313(4) (a) might be available, 
intervening unperfected security interest only when the underlying mortgage was "of record." 
The purpose of this reference was less than clear, and perhaps echoed some mortgage cases which 
denied priority to future advances if the mortgage was unrecorded. See G. Osborne, supra note 
36, § 119, at 192-94. Ironically, those cases denied priority to the future advance because the 
original mortgage itself was denied priority. Under section 9-313(4) (c) of the 1962 Code, how­
ever, the future advance was denied priority for lack of recordation even though the original 
unrecorded mortgage had priority over the fixture interest under section 9-313(4) (3) (affixation-
attachment cases) or under section 9-313(4)(a). 
'0^ See U.C.C. § 9-313(7) (1972). Of course, under subsection (5)(b), the secured party wins if 
the fixtures are trade fixtures in which the competing landlord has no interest. U.C.C. § 9-
313(5) (b) (1972). This is not, strictly speaking, a priority contest, but merely a restatement of the 
obvious principle that the secured party always wins where the landlord has no interest at all to 
claim. See supra text accompanying notes 97-101. 
See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. 
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irrespective of the nature of the collateral, or, if the collateral is 
"readily removable" and is within a narrow category of "machines" 
and appliances, section 9-313(4)(c) may also be used.'"® Section 9-
313(4)(b) is also available when the mortgage is unrecorded. 
Section 9-313(4) (a) is unique in that it requires the secured party 
to have purchase money status. The 1962 Code never required it, and 
neither does any other subsection of current section 9-313. In addition 
to having purchase money status, a secured party relying upon section 
9-313(4) (a) must perfect against the prior mortgagee (a major change 
from the 1962 law),'"® and perfection can only be achieved by a 
fixture filing.'"'' 
If these sections are inapplicable, the secured party can also have priority under section 9-
313(4)(b) if he perfects his security interest before the mortgage is recorded. 
See supra note 23 and text accompanying notes 15-17. Professor Adams saw in the lack of a 
perfection requirement a threat to the validity of the earlier real estate mortgage. He reasoned 
that the unperfected security interest was voidable in the debtor's bankruptcy, where the trustee, 
was given the status of a hypothetical lien creditor on the day that the bankruptcy petition was 
filed. 1898 Act § 70(c). Once avoided, the trustee could save the lien for the benefit of the estate 
and capture from the real estate mortgagee the senior priority of the UCC secured party, to the 
extent of the secured party's lien. Id. § 60(b). This much of the analysis is undeniable. Professor 
Adams suggests, however, that the trustee could subrogate himself to the secured party's rights 
under section 70(e) as well. Under the holding of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), the trustee 
could then have avoided the entire real estate mortgage, not merely the amount equivalent of the 
secured party's prior lien. Adams, supra note I, at 868-69. 
This theory seems to have a sound basis in the case law. E.g., Electric Constructors, Inc., v. 
Azar, 405 F.2d 475, 476-77 (5th Cir. 1968) (trustee could subrogate himself to a statutory lien 
creditor's rights and defeat a junior security interest). See also 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 1, § 45.3, 
at 1293-94; Googan, supra note 7, at 1338-39. But the idea that section 70(e) allowed subroga­
tion to lien rights seems dubious, in that it swallows whole the concept that avoided liens are 
preserved for the benefit of the bankrupt estate. Preservation of liens for the benefit of a 
bankrupt's estate prevents a windfall to junior secured parties who otherwise would benefit from 
the avoidance of a senior lien hy the trustee. See S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Gong., 2d Sess. 90, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News 5787, 5876. If junior liens were always void 
because the trustee could subrogate himself to senior liens and destroy the entire junior lien under 
Moore v. Bay, there would be no room for the lien preservation concept to work. 
It should also be noted that Professor Adams' theory of Moore v. Bay, in no way depends 
upon the avoidance of a senior security interest. Presumably the trustee could subrogate himself 
to any senior interest and could thereby eliminate any junior lien or mortgage from the picture. 
Fortunately, we will have no further opportunity to explore this thesis. The newly enacted 
BRA limits the trustee's subrogation power to the rights of unsecured creditors only. 11 U.S.G. § 
544(b)(Supp. V 1981). 
"" An ordinary UGG filing will not do, even if we substitute a prior lien creditor for a prior 
mortgagee. This is indeed a pretty piece of nonsense, since a subsequent lien creditor can be 
beaten by an ordinary UGG filing or (if the fixtures are consumer goods) by no filing at all. Why 
there are different perfection requirements for prior and subsequent lien creditors has no logical 
answer, but there may be a literary answer. The subsequent lien creditor was equated with the 
bankruptcy trustee. With that in mind, section 9-313(4)(d) was drafted with great care. But as 
for prior lien creditors, who have no bankruptcy significance, the drafters were indifferent and 
were content to lump them in with other prior encumbrancers. 
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While a secured party who relies upon section 9-313(4) (a) for 
priority must meet these rigorous perfection requirements, at least he 
receives the benefit of a ten-day grace period. The grace period com­
mences when the collateral is affixed to the real estate. This is differ­
ent from the usual purchase money grace period found elsewhere in 
the UCC, which begins to run when the debtor "receives possession" 
of the collateral. 10® Since receipt of possession is a logical prerequisite 
for affixation of the collateral to the debtor's real estate, it is possible, 
and perhaps common, for the grace period under section 9-313(4)(a) 
to be longer than the other grace periods for purchase money interests. 
More problematic for the fixture lender is the fact that the grace 
period granted by section 9-3I3(4)(a) is quite different from that given 
under federal bankruptcy law. Section 547(e) of the BRA presents 
considerable danger for the purchase money fixture lender who thinks 
he can rely on the grace period under section 9-313(4)(a). 
In order to sabotage any "secret liens," the preference statute has 
always deemed a transfer to occur when it is perfected against lien 
creditors or purchasers of real property. But a grace period has always 
been granted to avoid changing contemporaneously exchanged secur­
ity interests into transfers in satisfaction of antecedent debt where 
there are only small gaps between attachment and perfection of those 
interests.!"® Section 547(e) was therefore designed to give the secured 
party ten days to perfect his interest after it has attached. If the grace 
period has been met, the transfer is deemed to have occurred at the 
time of attachment. This transfer, if before the start of the preference 
period or if given in exchange for new value, is saved from avoidance; 
the transaction is either too early to be a voidable preference or is a 
contemporaneous exchange. If the grace period is not met, the trans­
fer is deemed to have occurred at the time of perfection, long after 
value has been given by the creditors. This transaction is considered to 
be in satisfaction of antecedent debt and is potentially voidable. 
Since affixation often occurs at a time different from attachment, 
a creditor relying solely on section 9-313(4) (a) for guidance as to when 
to perfect may find his security interest void if his debtor is bankrupt 
within ninety days of affixation. He may also lose his opportunity to 
prevail under section 547(c)(3). This section states that even if a 
U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), -312(4) (1972). 
Section 60(a)(7) of the 1898 Act provided a 21-day grace period. Unlike section 547(e), 
section 60(a)(7) was available only in cases where new value was given. See generally Breitowitz, 
supra note 59, at 388-408. 
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purchase money security interest is otherwise deemed a transfer in 
satisfaction of antecedent debt under section 547(e), it is immune from 
avoidance if the security interest is perfected within the ten-day grace 
period of 547(c)(3).This ten-day grace period also commences at 
attachment. A financing statement filed within the grace period of 
section 9-313(4)(a), therefore, may not protect the purchase money 
fixture lender from the bankruptcy trustee.'" 
A secured party who has not made a fixture filing within the 
grace period of section 9-313(4)(a) may have another opportunity to 
prevail if his collateral is of the type covered by section 9-313(4)(c). In 
order to qualify for the liberal filing rules of this section ("the security 
interest is perfected by any method permitted by the Article"), the 
collateral must be "readily removable factory or office machines or 
readily removable replacements of domestic appliances which are 
consumer goods. 
It is not clear how rigorously the restrictions on the types of 
collateral covered by section 9-313(4)(c) are, meant to apply. For 
example, consider again the case of the bar stools which are collateral 
for an Article 9 security interest. These stools may be "equipment" 
within the meaning of section 9-109 because they are used in busi­
ness,"^ but they do not seem to be "machines," even though they are 
"readily removable." Hence, nonmechanical equipment does not fall 
under section 9-313(4)(c).'" 
"» Section 547(c)(3) was written to save the enabling loan from destruction. When a bank 
lends purchase money, the security interest it will later receive will almost certainly be a transfer 
on account of antecedent debt. Section 547(c)(3) sets forth the elements of purchase money 
status, but requires that perfection of the security interest occur within 10 days of attachment. 
See id. at 425-29. , r. t.i. • j 
The converse circumstance also poses a bankruptcy risk: where the fixture filing is made 
before affixation of the collateral. Such a fixture filing is ineffective with regard to unaffixed 
collateral and only becomes effective upon eventual affixation. See supra text accompanying note 
68. If affixation is within 10 days of attachment, then the fixture filing becomes effective 
perfection, and section 547(e)(2)(A) deems the transfer to be made at the time of attachment If 
affixation is beyond the 10-day grace period, the transfer is deemed to be the time of affixation. 
In the latter case, delayed affixation turns an otherwise contemporaneous transfer into a transfer 
on account of antecedent debt. This proves yet again that the Review Committee has failed to 
remedy completely the mutually exclusive filing hazard that existed under the 1962 version of 
section 9-313. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
"2 u.c.c. § 9-313(4)(c) (1972). . . u • 
"Goods are ... (2) 'equipment' if they are used or bought for use primarily in busi­
ness "Id. §9-109. 
Coogan has criticized the choice of words in section 9-313(4)(c) and would have preferred 
that the term "equipment" had been used. Coogan, supra note 16, at 486-90. 
Professor Adams, who also finds section 9-313(4)(c) to be imprecise, raises a hypothetical 
question of a landlord who furnishes his apartment with encumbered air conditioners. Professor 
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The applicability of section 9-313(4) (c) to consumer goods is 
limited to those which are replacements. This rule was designed to 
give mortgagees (and all others except subsequent lien creditors) prior­
ity over secured parties with security interests in original appliances in 
new dwellings.''® Thereafter, replacements are eligible for Article 9 
financing."® The emphasis on replacements creates strange results in 
some circumstances—for example, where a homeowner buys a dish­
washer on credit subject to a purchase money security interest and 
installs it in a way that it becomes a fixture under the common law of 
the state. The applicability of 9-313(4) (c) will depend on whether or 
not the dishwasher is the first one the homeowner has bought. Also, if 
the homeowner has bought an additional dishwasher, it is not a 
"replacement," and section 9-313(4)(c) is not applicable. 
If a secured party can succeed in convincing a court that his 
collateral is readily removable machinery or replacements of con­
sumer goods, he will be excused from many of the rigors of section 9-
3I3(4)(a). He need not have technical purchase money status, he need 
not perfect with a fixture filing, and he can take priority over con­
struction mortgagees."^ On the down side, there is no grace period, 
perfection must be prior to affixation, and in the case of consumer 
goods, automatic perfection can be had only if the lender has purchase 
money status."® 
Why the grace period of section 9-313(4) (a) is denied to a secured 
party under section 9-3I3(4)(c) is not apparent."® Nor is it clear why 
7 
Adams argues that these air conditioners are consumer goods and are therefore covered only to 
the extent they are replacements of previous consumer goods. Adams, supra note 1, at 912. I 
would take issue with this analysis, since the landlord is not using the air conditioners for his own 
personal use. To the landlord, they are equipment. But, significantly, they are not office or 
factory.equipment and hence not covered by section 9-313(4)(c) at all. Accord Review Commit­
tee, supra note 16, para. A-10. Only perfection under section 9-313(4)(a) (which requires a 
fixture filing) is possible, and the secured party must have purchase money status as well. 
U.C.Q, § 9-313 comment 4(d) (1972). If the collateral is an original consumer appliance, a 
fixture filing will be required to beat all earlier real estate claimants, including lien creditors. Id. 
§ 9-313(4) (b). That leaves subsequent lien creditors as the only competing real estate claimants 
who, under section 9-313(4)(d), can be beaten by ordinary UCC perfection. 
Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A-10. 
U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972). Thus, even if the funds from the construction mortgagee are 
used to buy the collateral, the debtor may turn around and use this as collateral for a second 
loan. The secured party will prevail under section 9-313(4)(c), which does not require purchase 
money status. 
Id. § 9-302(l)(d). 
According to Professor Kripke, early proposals for grace periods against subsequent real 
estate owners and encumbrancers were staunchly opposed by the real estate industry. Kripke, 
Review Committee, supra note 1, at 308. Since section 9-313(4)(c) applies equally to subsequent 
and prior real estate interests, the failure to provide a grace period against prior interests may 
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purchase money status is strictly required under section 9-313(4)(a), 
but not section 9-313(4) (c). It is this sort of asymmetry which makes 
section 9-313(4) perhaps the most baroque of the UCC provisions. 
Finally, the secured party who has not perfected by the deadlines 
in sections 9-313(4)(a) or (c) can still win under section 9-313(4)(b) if 
the mortgage is unrecorded and the secured party is the first to perfect 
with a fixture filing. Even if the collateral is one of the "readily 
removable" items within the meaning of section 9-313(4) (c), a fixture 
filing will be required against an unrecorded mortgage whenever 
ordinary UCC perfection has not occurred before affixation. This 
seems less peculiar than some of the contrasts we have seen. It is only 
sporting that the mortgagee and the secured party race to the very 
same finishing line—the mortgage recording office. In addition, the 
secured party with section 9-313(4)(c) collateral who has missed his 
deadline for ordinary UCC perfection and who is without a fixture 
filing is vulnerable to subsequent mortgagees; it therefore seems just 
that he likewise be vulnerable to a mortgagee who recorded late.'^" 
Treating these two types of mortgagees equally will prevent the se­
cured party from trying to claim that a truly subsequent mortgage is 
really a subsequently recorded earlier mortgage subject to an opposite 
rule. Priority cases will therefore be easily decided by the order of 
recordation in the real estate records. 
B. Case Two: Mortgage-Affixation-Attachment 
and Section 9-313(4)(a) 
Under the 1962 Code, section 9-313(3) accorded priority to the 
prior mortgagee in the "affixation-then-attachment" case. The rule 
has not changed greatly under the 1972 amendments, although in one 
exceedingly narrow circumstance the secured party can prevail over a 
prior mortgagee. 
Where a prior mortgagee has promptly recorded'^^ his mortgage, 
section 9-313(4)(a) provides the only method by which the secured 
stem from this opposition, in which case perhaps the Review Committee drafted too broadly in 
deference to the views of the real estate bar. That is, section 9-313(4) (c) could have provided that 
subsequent real estate claimants lost even if perfection were after affixation, as long as perfection 
occurred before a competing real estate claimant recorded his interest. 
I question whether secured parties who miss their deadline under section 9-313(4)(c) 
should still be required to make a fixture filing to beat subsequent mortgages. If that criticism is 
well taken, then the point in the text also should be reversed. See supra note 119. 
If the mortgagee fails to record, the secured party can always prevail by perfecting first 
with a fixture filing pursuant to section 9-313(4)(b). 
1983] FIXTURE PRIORITIES 413 
party in an "affixation-then-attachment" case can prevail, but only 
under the most unusual of circumstances. In order to have priority 
under section 9-313(4) (a) the secured party must have purchase 
money status and must make a fixture filing within ten days of affix­
ation. This is theoretically possible. Suppose that a merchant sells a 
dishwasher to the debtor on credit subject to a purchase money secur­
ity agreement. The parties orally agree to the security interest but 
neglect to place their signatures on a written agreement that comports 
with the requirements of section 9-203(1)(a).'" The debtor takes the 
dishwasher home and affixes it to his real estate, which is subject to a 
mortgage with an after-acquired property clause encompassing fix­
tures. On the day after affixation, the seller realizes his mistake and 
rushes to the debtor's home for his signature. When the debtor signs, 
t h e  s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t  h a s  n o w  a t t a c h e d  o n e  d a y  a f t e r  a f f i x a t i o n . T h e  
secured party then files a fixture filing within ten days after affixation. 
This scenario is just about the only one in which a secured party will 
have the opportunity for priority in an "affixation-then-attachment" 
case under section 9-313(4)(a). If that section offers little hope, section 
9-313(4)(c) provides none at all, even if the dishwasher is a replace­
ment. Here, attachment must precede affixation because section 9-
'22 The exact words of section 9-313(4)(a) provide that the secured party must perfect within 
10 days of affixation. Mere filing is not enough. Since perfection presupposes attachment, 
U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972), it must also be true that all the elements of attachment, U.C.C. § 9-
203 (1972) (signed security agreement, debtor gets rights in collateral, and creditor gives value), 
must also take place within the 10-day period. 
'22 Section 9-203(1) (a) provides that 
a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third party with respect to 
the collateral and does not attach unless: 
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to 
agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which con­
tains a description of the collateral .... 
'2'' Delayed signature of the security agreement is not unknown in fixture cases. See Honea v. 
Laco Auto Leasing, Inc., 454 P.2d 782 (N.M. App. 1969). That case, decided under the 1962 
Code, held that attachment occurred as soon as the parties orally agreed upon a security 
agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1962). Cf. id. § 9-203(1) (nonpossessory security interest "not 
enforceable" until the debtor has signed the security agreement). Under the 1972 amendments, 
attachment cannot occur before the debtor's signature is on the agreement, id. § 9-
203(l)(a)(1972), and thus, the Honea case would have been an "affixation-attachment" case, if 
the 1972 amendments had governed. Hence, both attachment and the fixture filing would have 
been required within 10 days of affixation in order for the secuired party to prevail. Id. § 9-
313(4)(a). 
In Sunshine v. Sanray Floor Covering Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 780, 315 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 
1970), the debtor signed after affixation. The court, construing the 1962 Code, stated that 
attachment was after affixation. But this assumes that the debtor and the secured party had not 
agreed upon a security interest orally before affixation, a possible but most unlikely circum­
stance. 
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313(4) (c) requires that perfection precede affixation; under section 9-
303(1) there cannot be perfection until attachment has occurred.*^® 
Once again it appears that a relatively straightforward provision 
from the 1962 Code—section 9-313(2)—has been transformed into a 
curious puzzle in the "affixation-then-attachment" cases. The secured 
party can prevail over earlier real estate interests in only the most 
unusual of cases. 
C. Cases Three and Four: Attachment-Mortgage-Affixation 
and Affixation-Mortgage-Attachment 
Under the 1962 Code, the priorities in an "attachment-mortgage-
affixation" case were the same as those where the sequence was "mort­
gage-attachment-affixation."Section 9-313(2) clearly applied in 
both situations. Similarly, section 9-313(3) governed both "mortgage-
affixation-attachment" and "affixation-mortgage-attachment." 
This symmetry has been destroyed by the 1972 amendments. 
The 1972 Code continues to treat the cases of "attachment-mort­
gage-affixation" and "mortgage-attachment-affixation" in the same 
manner. In either situation the secured party can prevail under sec­
tion 9-313(4) (a) if he has purchase money status and has perfected by 
a fixture filing within ten days of affixation. If the competing real 
estate claimant has failed to record his interest, priority under section 
9-313(4) (b) is also possible whenever the secured party is the first to 
file. Finally, a secured party may gain priority under section 9-
313(4)(c) if his collateral qualifies and if he perfects (by any method) 
prior to affixation. 
Since 1972, the "mortgage-affixation-attachment" case has been 
treated differently from the "affixation-mortgage-attachment" case. 
As was demonstrated in "case two," where the mortgage preceded 
affixation and attachment, the secured party had a remote possibility 
for priority under section 9-313(4)(a). If, however, the sequence is 
"affixation-mortgage-attachment," the secured party cannot avail 
himself of this section. This is because section 9-313(4) (a) requires that 
"the interest of the encumbrancer or owner arise before the goods 
Note that section 9-313(4)(a) has no such requirement. Therefore, the security interest in 
the dishwasher referred to in the text can be senior only under section 9-313(4)(a), even if the 
dishwasher is a consumer replacement within the meaning of section 9-313(4)(c). 
See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
See id. 
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become fixtures." Thus, when the mortgage follows affixation, all 
chances for financing preaffixed collateral with priority over the 
mortgagee disappear, except when a mortgage is unrecorded and 
where attachment of the security interest and its perfection hy a 
fixture filing are achieved before mortgage recordation. In such a 
case, the secured party wins under section 9-313(4) (h). 
D. Cases Five and Six: Subsequent Mortgages 
Before the 1972 amendments, section 9-313(4) alone governed 
the subsequent mortgagee's priority, and "subsequent" meant subse­
quent to both attachment and affixation.Today, three subsections 
can conceivably govern the priority of a subsequent real estate inter­
est. Only subsection (a) of section 9-313(4) (1972) requires that "the 
interest of the encumbrancer or owner arise[] before the goods become 
fixtures." Therefore, any of the other subsections can aid the secured 
party in gaining priority. Since section 9-313(4)(a) is inapplicable, the 
secured party does not need purchase money status in order to prevail 
unless he wishes to rely on automatic perfection of an interest in 
consumer goods. 
Section 9-313(4) (c) is available to the secured party where there is 
a subsequent mortgage. Of course, the nature of the collateral is 
crucial. If it qualifies as readily removable office or factory machines 
or replacements of consumer goods, the secured party can prevail if he 
perfects, by any means, prior to affixation. 
If the secured party's collateral does not meet the requirements of 
section 9-313(4) (c) or if he does not meet section 9-313(4) (c)'s merciless 
deadline for an ordinary UCC filing, his only hope for priority over 
subsequent purchasers or mortgagees is to proceed under section 9-
313(4)(b). Under this section, there must be perfection by a fixture 
filing before the interest of the mortgagee is recorded. This section 
reduces the contest between the mortgagee and the secured party to a 
pure race to file in the real estate records. 
See id. 
"i® Purehase money status for this purpose is required under section 9-302(1) (d) of the 1972 
Code. Ordinarily, one would expect purchase money status to be helpful only against after-
aequired property interests that were filed earlier in time. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3),-(4) (1972). But 
here is one circumstance where purchase money status is necessary to beat subsequently created 
interests. 
Even if the secured party wins the race, he may lose if his filing is not deemed to meet the 
requirements of 9-313(l)(b). E.g., Corning Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d 
949 (1979) (filing not sufficient because it contained no description of real property). 
416 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:381 
One may fairly question the deadline in section 9-313(4) (c) for 
ordinary UCC perfection as applied to truly subsequent mortga­
gees.'^' The whole premise of section 9-313(4)(c) is that the collateral 
covered therein is not typically expected to be part of the real estate 
available to mortgagees or purchasers and that therefore a fixture 
filing need not be required.With regard to earlier mortgages, the 
rule of "first in time is first in right" dictates that the deadline be 
imposed (and even here the Review Committee should have made a 
purchase money exception).'" No such justification exists for subse­
quent mortgages, however.''^ If they truly do not expect to find real 
estate recordations on readily removable office machines and con­
sumer appliances, there seems little reason to require a fixture filing in 
cases where the secured party has not met his section 9-313(4) (c) 
deadline."'' 
It is curious that the treatment of prior and subsequent mortgagees and purchasers under 
section 9-313(4) is so drastically different. As to mortgagees and purchasers earlier in time, a 
grace period is given to purchase money security interests. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a) (1972). No grace 
period exists when these same parties are subsequent. Thus, if collateral is affixed on Tuesday, a 
Monday purchaser of real estate is burdened by a grace period, while a Wednesday purchaser is 
not. The difference can be explained by the fact that the Wednesday purchaser relies on the state 
of the record and is entitled to proteetion. The Monday purchaser does not rely on the state of the 
record and does not purport to buy unaffixed personal property. As to him a grace period seems 
more acceptable. . , 
Under section 9-301, a distinction is made between lien creditors (subject to a grace period 
in purchase money cases) and buyers (who are not burdened by a grace period). But this 
distinction is entirely different in kind from what 1 have said about prior and subsequent real 
estate claimants. Under section 9-301(2), neither the lien creditor nor purchaser can be prior in 
time to the purchase money security interest, which arises instantaneously upon the debtor 
obtaining rights in the collateral. Under section 9-313 this temporal factor is all-important 
Encumbrancers, at least, can have an interest in the underlying real estate before collateral is 
affixed And under the fixture statute, no distinction is made between buyers and encumbrancers 
(except subsequent lien creditors, who are treated differently) whereas the distinction between 
lien creditors and buyers under section 9-301 is fundamental. 
132 "The Committee considers that factory and office machines are not always financed as part 
of a consturction mortgage, and that it is reasonable to expeet the mortgagee to be alert to 
conflicting chattel financing of these machines." Review Committee, supra note 16, para. A 9. 
In other words, when collateral is affixed to real estate before a security interest is 
perfected, the earlier recorded mortgage lien will have already attached. When the mortgage 
attaches, it comes into competition with an unperfected security interest. The rule of "first m 
time is first in right" therefore supports priority for the mortgagee. A purchase money security 
interest could be given a grace period here without much harm to the mortgage industry, and 
such a rule would make section 9-313(4)(c) consistent with similar grace periods given against 
lien creditors and other secured parties. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), -312(4) (1972). 
134 when the mortgage arises subsequent to affixation and perfection of the security interest, 
the mortgage attaches to the collateral at a time when the security interest is already perfected. 
The rule of "first in time is first in right" cannot therefore apply to truly subsequent mortgag^. 
Nor can it apply to unrecorded mortgages which are recorded after collateral is affixed and the 
security interest is perfected. Under the eurrent statute, earlier mortgages which are subse­
quently recorded can only be defeated by a fixture filing under section 9-313(4) (b). 
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The secured party has an additional opportunity to prevail when 
a lien creditor is substituted for a mortgagee: section 9-313(4) (d) gives 
the secured party priority when he has perfected by any manner 
before the creditor obtains the lien "by legal or equitable proceed­
ings.""® 
Under the 1962 Code, all lien creditors, whether "prior" or "sub­
sequent" to the security interest, were treated similarly to prior or 
subsequent mortgages. Section 9-3I3(4)(d) was included in the 1972 
amendments in an attempt to protect the fixture lender from the 
bankruptcy trustee, but the measure of protection is diminished by an 
ambiguity as to timing. The statute makes clear that the lien itself 
must be "obtained" after perfection has occurred. What is left unclear 
is whether the judicial or equitable proceedings giving rise to the lien 
must also be subsequent to perfection. It is contended that the timing 
of the judical proceedings should be irrelevant. 
By way of illustration, consider a situation where ordinary con­
sumer goods are subjected to an automatically perfected purchase 
money security interest, but are not yet affixed to the debtor's real 
estate. At the point they are affixed and thereby transformed into real 
estate, a lien creditor will have "obtained" a lien on the fixtures, but 
not before."® The judgment lien on consumer goods, therefore, should 
be deemed "subsequent" within the meaning of section 9-313(4) (d), 
and no further action on the part of the secured party would be 
necessary to defeat the lien creditor. If, however, the lien were held 
not to be subsequent, because the judicial proceedings which gave rise 
to it antedated perfection, it would have to be treated as a prior lien 
under section 9-313(4)(a). Such a lien can be subordinated only by a 
fixture filing. 
The proper reading of section 9-313(4) (d) is that a security inter­
est that is perfected before affixation will take priority over a judicial 
lien which is in place on the underlying real estate at the time of 
affixation. A fixture filing under section 9-313(4)(a) should not be 
required in such a case. 
A final observation is that subsequent lien creditors may theoreti­
cally be subordinated under sections 9-313 (4) (b) and (c), but section 9-
The exact language of section 9-313(4) (b) is such that the secured party prevails when "the 
security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the encumbrancer ... is of 
record." A lien on real estate generally does not arise until the judgment has been docketed 
within the county where the real estate is located. It is at that point that the judgment lien is "of 
record" within the meaning of section 9-313(4) (b). 
In re Darwin, 117 F. 407 (6th Cir. 1902). 
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313(4) (d) subsumes these sections with more liberal perfection re­
quirements. Section 9-313(4)(b) requires a fixture filing before the lien 
is of record, whereas section 9-313(4) (c) requires perfection before 
affixation. Under section 9-313(4)(d), the secured party can perfect 
after affixation, so long as he perfects before the judgment lien on the 
fixtures is obtained. 
IV. Priorities Between Two Security Interests in the Same Fixture 
Section 9-313 presupposes a priority battle between a classic real 
estate claimant—such as an owner or mortgagee—and an Article 9 
secured party. The section does not seem to govern priorities between 
competing secured parties who both claim a fixture. Not a first glance 
anyway. 
White and Summers have thought about and disposed of the 
priorities between fixture lenders with admirable succinctness. They 
conclude, "presumably neither party holds an encumbrance as that 
term is defined in 9-105(l)(g). Their relative priority, if determined at 
all under Article 9[,] will be settled by 9-312."'^^ Their analysis de­
pends first on the assumption that section 9-312 easily solves the 
priority problems, and second on the supposition that a fixture interest 
under Article 9 is not an "encumbrance." 
In fact, section 9-312, as applied to fixture interests under the 
1962 Code, was not so easy to apply. Let us compare the typical case 
of a purchase money secured party versus a lender with a security 
interest in after-acquired property, where both security interests have 
attached to the collateral before it is affixed to the real estate."® Under 
section 9-312(4), the purchase money lender won if he perfected his 
interest before the end of his ten-day grace period, which started to 
run when the debtor received possession of the collateral. But once the 
collateral became a fixture, the UCC filings were no longer adequate 
to perfect the interests in fixtures. Both interests were therefore ren­
dered unperfected. Section 9-312(4) provided no clue as to how to 
treat purchase money priority when all perfection had lapsed. 
Lapsed perfection was a most painful subject under the 1962 
Code."® It was generally agreed that interests arising after the lapse 
J. White & R. Summers, supra note 13, § 25-11, at 1064. 
Attachment of these two security interests, of course, will generally occur simultaneously, 
i.e., when the debtor obtains rights in the collateral. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
A number of sections of Article 9 allow for the possibility of lapse. See U.C.C. § 9-103 
(1972) (four-month temporary perfection when goods are moved to another state or, in the case 
of mobile goods or intangibles, when the debtor's headquarters are moved); id. § 9-304(4) (21-
day grace period for interest in instruments or documents of title); id. § 9-306(3) (10 days 
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were to be given priority as if the security interest were unperfected. 
But there were two schools of thought about interests that arose before 
the lapsed^" Some thought that the lapse was prospective only, and 
benefited only claimants with interests arising after the lapse. As to 
prelapse claimants, they were to be treated as if the lapse had never 
o c c u r r e d .  T h e i r  j u n i o r  p r i o r i t y  w a s  f r o z e n  i n  p l a c e  f o r e v e r . T h e  
second school of thought was that when perfection lapsed, it was 
repealed nunc pro tunc. This view is reflected in the 1962 comments 
to section 9-103.Under this view, the courts were supposed to treat 
priorities of prelapse interests under the assumption that the security 
interest's perfection had never existed. 
With regard to fixture disputes under the 1962 Code, the "pro­
spective" school would have said that the priorities before the lapse 
temporary perfection for some identifiable proceeds); id. § 9-403(2) (lapse after five years from 
filing). 
See Breitowitz, supra note 59, at 404-08. 
This view can be seen in cases arising under section 9-103 of the 1962 Code, which 
provided that if personal property subject to a perfected security interest was moved to another 
state, the secured party had a four-month grace period in which to perfect in the new state. If 
reperfection was not achieved within this period, the choice between prospective and retrospec­
tive effect of lapse would determine the priority between the security interest and a party who 
purchased during the four-month period. 
A number of jurisdictions have interpreted the four-month provision as entirely prospective. 
Thus, even if the secured party failed to refile within four months of removal, he did not become 
subordinate to the rights of an individual who purchased the property during the grace period. 
Pasack Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Ritar Ford, Inc., 6 Conn. Cir. 489, 276 A.2d 800 (1970); 
American State Bank v. White, 217 Kan.78, 535 P.2d 424 (1975); Community Credit Co. v. 
Gillham, 191 Neb. 198, 214 N.W.2d 384 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Novak v. Nelson, 
209 Neb. 728, 311 N.W.2d 8 (1981); Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 A.D.2d 
560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1962); Newton-Waltham Bank & Trust Co. v. Bergen Motors, Inc., 68 
Misc.2d 228, 327 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Civ. Ct. I97I); AI Maroone Ford, Inc., v. Manheim Auto 
Auction Inc., 205 Pa. Super. 154, 208 A.2d 290 (1965); Morris v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 10 
Wash. App. 129, 516 P.2d 1055 (1973). 
The four-month period is long enough for a secured party to discover in most cases 
that the collateral has been removed and to file in this state; thereafter, if he has not 
done so, his interest, although originally perfected in the state where it attached, is 
subject to defeat here by those persons who take priority over an unperfected security 
interest. . . . Under Section 9-312(5) the holder of a perfected conflicting security 
interest is such a person even though during the four-month period the conflicting 
interest was junior. 
U.C.C. § 9-103 comment 7 (Official Text 1962). 
See Vernon, Recorded Chattel Security Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 
346, 377-79 (1962); cf. United States v. Squires, 378 F. Supp. 798, 803 (S.D. Iowa 1974) ("[I]t 
would seem that the failure to file, in essence, relates back . . . ."). The decision in Squires seems 
to rest on the court's sympathy for the good faith purchaser, who bought without any knowledge 
of the existence of a competing interest. See also General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Isaacs, 90 Wash. 
2d 234, 238, 581 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1978) (lapse under section 9-403(2) said to be retrospective 
with regard to judicial liens arising before the lapse). 
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were frozen and that the purchase money lender won. The retroactive 
school would have treated this as a priority battle between two unper-
fected security interests. In a purchase money versus after-acquired 
property case, the priority was very tricky, since attachment of the 
two interests would have occurred simultaneously—when the debtor 
obtained rights in the collateral. Section 9-312(5)(b) instructed that, 
where no one has perfected, priority is to be given to the first security 
interest to attach. Rut it did not resolve cases of simultaneous attach­
ment. Perhaps the secured parties should have split the collateral 
between them.''''' In addition, a secured party relying on section 9-
3I2(5)(b) was in a most precarious position. The first secured party to 
make a fixture filing would capture seniority, and since repossession 
was a form of perfection,'^® the repossessing secured party would 
automatically establish seniority. In any case, if the retroactive school 
of thought held the correct view on lapsed perfection, section 9-312 
became a treacherous means by which to determine priorities.'^® 
As authority for the concept that the secured parties should divide the collateral, see 
Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N.Y. 430, 111 N.E. 70 (1916). In this case, two creditors docketed 
judgments against the defendant at a time when he had no real estate. The docketing of the 
judgments would have created liens on his real estate, if he had any. Later, the judgment debtor 
inherited some real estate, to which the liens attached immediately and simultaneously. The 
New York Court of Appeals assumed that these parties should share the proceeds on a pro rata 
basis. 
In re Chapman, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 649 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1968); Trans­
port Acceptance Corp. v. Crosby, 19 Bankr. 436, 438 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); Stanley v. Fabricators, 
Inc., 459 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1969); see U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978). 
In Babson Credit Plan, Inc. v. Cordele Prods. Credit Ass'n, 146 Ga. App. 266, 246 S.E. 2d 
354 (1978), the Georgia Court of Appeals considered priorities between an after-acquried 
property security interest and a purchase money security interest. Each had perfected by 
ordinary UCC means in a timely fashion, and neither had perfected with a fixture filing. Upon 
affixation, perfection of both security interests lapsed. 
The court awarded victory to the purchase money lender, but not under the prospective 
theory of lapsed perfection. Instead, the court focused on the fact that the after-acquired 
property party also had a real estate mortgage. Under the 1962 Code, which was then in effect in 
Georgia, the after-acquired party as mortgagee was clearly subordinate under section 9-313(2). 
The court, without much discussion, simply assumed that the after-acquired property interest 
should also be subordinated in the interest of preserving the full effect of section 9-313(2). Section 
9-312(4) was never mentioned. 
A similar case, where the after-acquired property party had both a mortgage and a security 
interest in after-acquired property, is Sunshine v. Sanray Floor Covering Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 780, 
315 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1970). In this case the purchase money lender lost. First of all, he did 
not file in time to take advantage of section 9-312(4). That made the after-acquired property 
interest senior to the purchase money security interest. Second, the court assumed that attach­
ment of the security interest occurred after affixation of the collateral to the real estate. This 
made the purchase money security interest subordinate to the mortgage under section 9-313(3). 
As to the latter point, the court equated attachment with the debtor signing the security 
agreement which occurred after affixation. While this is possible, it is more likely that the parties 
had orally agreed to a security interest at the time of the sales contract. Under the 1962 Code, a 
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Under the 1972 Code, use of section 9-312 to solve such disputes 
seems less problematic. Perfection no longer lapses under the 1972 
version of the Code. Therefore, since one need not face the lapse 
question, section 9-312 seems easier to use. But the 1972 amendments 
also introduced a very broad definition of "encumbrance." Section 9-
312 is usable only if Professors White and Summers have presumed 
correctly that security interests are not real estate encumbrances 
within the meaning of section 9-105(g). I would suggest that the 
definition does indeed fit security interests on fixtures and that these 
priority problems are better decided under section 9-313 than under 
section 9-312. 
According to section 9-105(g), " 'encumbrance' includes real es­
tate mortgages and other liens on real estate and all other rights in real 
estate that are not ownership interests . . . ." Fixtures are real es­
tate,'^'' and security interests are liens.Therefore, the definition 
seems to fit. If it does, then each fixture party is an "encumbrancer" 
with regard to the other. 
The result is that, in most cases, the first secured party to make a 
fixture filing will win under section 9-313(4)(b). The only exception to 
this is in the case of collateral qualifying under section 9-3I3(4)(c)— 
readily removable office machines and consumer appliance replace­
ments. In such a case, ordinary UCC filings are sufficient to beat prior 
and subsequent encumbrancers, and so section 9-312 could be applied 
safely here. But section 9-313(4)(c) does require perfection before 
affixation. In a case where one of the parties has not perfected by this 
deadline, the prior perfected secured party wins under either section 
9-312 or 9-313(4) (c), except in one case. If the unperfected secured 
party is a purchase money secured party, section 9-312(4) would 
award him victory if he eventually perfects within the ten-day grace 
period. But under section 9-313(4) (c), the earlier perfected security 
interest beats the purchase money lender who files after affixation and 
within the 9-312(4) grace period, because the purchase money security 
mere oral agreement to create a security interest established attachment. See supra note 124. One 
suspects that the court did not understand the significance of any oral agreement preceding the 
written agreement. 
If, in Sunshine, there had been an oral agreement before affixation, the purchase money 
secured party would have been senior to the mortgage under section 9-313(2). However, he still 
would have been junior to the mortgagee's security interest under section 9-312. 
"[Gjoods are 'fixtures' when they become so related to particular real estate that an interest 
in them arises under real estate law." U.C.C. § 9-313(l)(a) (1972). 
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (Supp. V 1981) (" 'security interest' means lien created by 
agreement"). 
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interest is an "encumbrancer," and the other secured party has com­
plied with section 9-313(4)(c). In this narrow circumstance, sections 9-
312 and 9-313 are in conflict. 
In any case, section 9-313(4)(a) is totally irrelevant to disputes 
between secured parties over fixtures. That section requires the "en­
cumbrance" to have existed on real estate before affixation. Since 
affixation creates "encumbrancehood" for both parties, neither party 
can ever satisfy this requirement as against the other. 
That leaves us with section 9-313(4) (b), where the first party to 
make a fixture filing wins. Use of this section instead of section 9-312 
achieves an important objective. It eliminates the possibility of a 
circular priority when a real estate mortgagee or some equivalent real 
estate claimant is in the picture. As between the two security interests 
and the mortgage, the first to make a real estate recording clearly 
wins. But if section 9-312 applies between the secured parties inter se, 
a secured party who is senior to the mortgagee may easily wind up 
junior to a secured party who has never made a fixture filing but who 
perfected by ordinary UCC means in time to assure priority under 
section 9-312. Thus, the secured party with a fixture filing could beat 
a mortgagee, who beats a secured party with no fixture filing, who in 
turn beats the secured party with a fixture filing. If we assume that all 
fixture interests are encumbrances, we avoid this circular priority, 
and we award victory to the party who first recorded an interest in the 
real estate records. 
Superficially, it may seem that secured parties who may not 
know whether the collateral will become fixtures should be able to 
rely on the usual UCC rules and should not have the extra burden of 
worrying about the real estate records. It is true that, in creating 
priority rules, we should be wary of generating added expense for 
assuring seniority. This additional burden undoubtedly raises the cost 
of secured lending and is therefore undesirable. But we face no danger 
of generating such costs here. The duty to police the collateral for 
affixation already exists. Secured parties must already make fixture 
filings after affixation in order to beat real estate claimants. It is 
therefore not unfair to make secured parties undertake the same filing 
to beat other secured parties as well. Furthermore, as between a 
secured party who has policed the collateral in this regard and has 
made the fixture filing, on the one hand, and the secured party who 
has neglected this duty which is clearly imposed on him, it seems just 
to reward the secured party who followed the course imposed by the 
UCC over the party who did not. 
To summarize, Professors White and Summers may have been a 
little too brief in dealing with priorities between two secured parties 
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with fixture interests. Under the 1962 Code, we are forced to deal 
with the difficult riddle of lapsed perfection. It is, therefore, not so 
clear what those priorities are even if section 9-312 applies. Under the 
1972 amendments, the definition of "encumbrance" is so broad that it 
is hard to see how a security interest in fixtures does not qualify. If it 
does, the problem is better resolved under section 9-313(4)(b) than 
section 9-312, since we can avoid a circular priority and thereby 
reward the secured party who best polices his collateral in exactly the 
way the UCC demands that it be policed. That is, we will be favoring 
the secured party who first makes a fixture filing. 
V. Use of Sections 9-401(2) and (3) to Cure a Lack of a Fixture Filing 
Sections 9-401(2) and (3) are rare instances where the harsh 
realities of Article 9 perfection are tempered. Ordinarily, a secured 
party who files in the wrong place is deemed unperfected and will 
probably lose a priority battle to his competitor even when the com­
petitor was in no way misled. The UCC is largely a "race" statute, 
and knowledge of the competing claimant is usually irrelevant.'^® In 
contrast, section 9-401(2) protects the secured party in cases where he 
filed in the wrong place, provided the competing claimant had knowl­
edge of the contents of the financing statement.'®® In addition, section 
9-401(3) protects him in cases where he filed initially in the right place 
but where the collateral has undergone a "change of use."'®' Both 
these sections relieve the secured party from problems with the loca­
tion of filing. 
It is a mystery whether and how these sections of the UCC might 
apply to fixture cases. Section 9-401(2) is not particularly trouble­
some. It was utterly unhelpful in fixture cases under the 1962 Code,'®^ 
»» But see U.C.C. §§ 9-301(l)(d), -314(3) (1972). 
Section 9-401(2) of the 1972 Code provides; 
A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in all of the places 
required hy this section is nevertheless effective with regard to any collateral as to 
which the filing complied with the requirements of this Article and is also effective 
with regard to collateral covered by the financing statement against any person who 
has knowledge of such financing statement. 
Section 9-401(3) provides; 
A filing which is made in the proper place in this state continues effective even 
though the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of the collateral or 
its use, whichever controlled the original filing, is thereafter changed. 
'5® Section 9-401(2) is only useful where perfection is useful. Under the 1962 version of section 
9-313, real estate claimants who were earlier in time had their priorities established without 
regard to perfection of the security interest. Id. § 9-313(2)-(3) (1962). Subsequent real estate 
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and, if applied to fixture cases under the 1972 amendments, it raises 
few unsettling problems. Section 9-401(2) subordinates only those 
parties with actual knowledge.'®^ If real estate claimants are subordi­
nated under this principle, it will not undermine the guiding principle 
of both the 1962 and 1972 versions of section 9-313 that real estate title 
searches should be limited to searches of the traditional real estate 
records and should not include searches of the UCC files.'®'' 
Application of section 9-401(3) is another matter. This section 
relieves the secured party from having to refile every time the debtor 
changes the "use" of the collateral.'®® Change of use may change the 
location of the proper place to file. Thus, when a consumer appliance 
is used in a business and therefore becomes equipment, the latter two 
alternative texts of section 9-401(1) tell us that the proper place to file 
is the office of the secretary of state, not merely the office in the 
county where the debtor resides.'®® Section 9-401(3) is of great value to 
the secured party here. 
An unanswered question is whether affixation of collateral to real 
estate is a "change of use." Consumer goods remain consumer goods 
once they become fixtures, and therefore it is open to argument that 
affixation alone is not a change of use.'®''' But section 9-401(3) seems to 
contemplate protection whenever an event happens that changes the 
proper place to file. Very frequently affixation will change the loca­
tion of the proper place to file. Linguistically, one cannot be certain 
claimants (where there was no fixture filing) were subordinated whenever they had knowledge 
of the underlying security interest, a standard of knowledge less rigorous than the standard 
required by section 9-401(2). Therefore, section 9-401(2) is irrelevant in fixture cases decided 
under the 1962 Code. 
There is no "shelter" provision in this section. Therefore, a security interest junior in the 
hands of a party with knowledge becomes senior in the hands of a good faith assignee. 
See Kripke, Fixtures, supra note 1, at 46. 
It should be noted that there are two alternative versions of section 9-401(3). The first 
protects the secured party from having to refile whenever the debtor changes his residence, place 
of business, or the location of the collateral. The second protects the secured party from such 
changes only for four months. Each version, however, protects the secured party if the use to 
which the collateral is put undergoes change. 
Under the first option of section 9-401(1), every security interest not connected with real 
estate must be filed with the secretary of state, so that the example in the text would not cause a 
change in the place to file. Under the second option, the proper place to file would change to the 
secretary of state's office. Under the third option, the result is the same, except that if the debtor 
has but one place of business in the state, a second filing would have to be made in the local 
county. 
Section 9-109 divides "goods" into "consumer goods," "inventory," "equipment" and "farm 
products." It could be that change of use only refers to transfers between the categories within 
section 9-109. It might therefore not include changes between personal property status and real 
property status. 
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that affixation is not a change of use within the meaning of section 9-
401(3). 
Another problem with the application of both sections 9-401(2) 
and (3) to fixture cases is that each subsection refers to financing 
statements being "effective." Under section 9-401(2), the financing 
statement is effective against knowledgeable parties, while, under 
section 9-401(3), a financing statement remains effective in spite of 
subsequent changes in the proper place to file. 
These sections are written as if the only obstacle to perfection is 
that a financing statement is filed in the wrong place. In fixture cases, 
it may well be that once the location error is corrected, a financing 
statement is still deficient under section 9-402(5) because there is no 
description of the real estate. Do sections 9-401(2) and (3) also correct 
formal insufficiencies as well as location errors? 
Read literally, the proclamation that financing statements are or 
continue to be "effective" suggests that all errors are corrected. If so, 
failure to describe the real estate in the financing statement does not 
prevent the application of these sections in fixture disputes. But there 
are two monumental objections to this reading. First, if failure to 
meet the requirements of section 9-402(5) can be ignored in the inter­
est of making financing statements fully effective, why cannot other 
omissions in the financing statement be cured as well? If the financing 
statement is filed in the wrong place, or if a change in use or the 
debtor's location occurs after filing in the right place, do sections 9-
401(2) and (3) paper over the failure of the debtor to sign the financ­
ing statement? If it does, why should a secured party who makes an 
error under section 9-401(2) or who benefits from the fortuity of 
changed circumstances under section 9-401(3) benefit from forgive­
ness of section 9-402 errors when secured parties who do not make 
errors have no such advantage?'®® One possible answer is that, at least 
under section 9-401(3), the financing statement is to continue effec­
tive. Thus, if the financing statement was not originally effective, 
section 9-401(3) cannot very well continue that which never existed. 
Thus, section 9-401(3) requires that the debtor sign the financing 
statement and do the other things necessary to make the financing 
statement good as to unaffixed collateral. In such a case, the real 
estate description might be left out and the financing statement could 
still continue to be effective. Not so when another more fundamental 
All secured parties benefit from section 9-402(8), which excuses "minor errors which are 
not seriously misleading." I am assuming that the errors under consideration would he consid­
ered major omissions. See In re Keefer, 26 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983) (omission of 
debtor's address was a major faux pas). 
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type of defect in the financing statement exists. In that case, an 
effective financing statement never existed. 
This argument works less successfully with section 9-401(2), 
which speaks of the financing statement being totally effective if the 
requirements of section 9-401(2) are met. With this section, we cannot 
so easily rely upon the notion that the financing statement must have 
been adequate at some time in its life, as we could with section 9-
401(3).^®® Instead, we are faced with a choice: section 9-401(2) cures 
all formal defects in the financing statement, or it cures none. The 
latter view seems more rational, in which case the failure to describe 
real estate in the financing statement may render section 9-401(2) 
unusable in fixture cases. 
Even this view raises troubling inconsistencies. For instance, a 
competing real estate claimant may have all the knowledge required 
by section 9-401(2), including knowledge of the real estate where 
affixation occurred. But because the financing statement did not de­
scribe what the competing claimant already knew, section 9-401(2) 
could not be used to subordinate that claimant. This reduces section 9-
401(2) to a somewhat fatuous provision as applied in fixture eases. 
Whereas the use of section 9-401(2) in fixture cases is obviously 
not a serious impediment to the legislative intent behind section 9-313, 
the use of section 9-401(3) would completely devastate the legislative 
scheme. Therefore, 1 would propose that section 9-401(3) be barred 
from use in fixture cases. A principal theme behind section 9-313 is 
that real estate title searchers should be entitled to rely on the state of 
the real estate record and should not have to start searching UCC files 
as well. An exception is made under section 9-313(4)(c), where the 
There is language in section 9-401(2) that superficially supports the view that formal errors 
are not corrected. That section states that wrongfully filed financing statements are "nevertheless 
effective with regard to any collateral as to which the filing complied with the requirements of 
this Article [regardless of knowledge] and is also effective with regard to collateral covered by the 
financing statement against any person who has knowledge . . . U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1972) 
(emphasis added). One could read the first clause to require that financing statements must 
always comply with all other requirements except the place of filing, including the requirements 
of section 9-402. But the intent of the first clause seems to be somewhat different. The clause in 
italics is designed to establish that a financing statement filed in the right place for a part of the 
collateral remains effective to perfect an interest in that part of the collateral. It does not follow 
inexorably that financing statements which are filed in the wrong place for all the collateral must 
conform in all ways to section 9-402, although for other reasons, I think that this is the view that 
should be taken. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that "filing" or "financing statement" as used in sections 9-
401(2) and (3) refer to a "sufficient financing statement" within the meaning of section 9-402. 
Because of the policy matters to be discussed in the text, this must be the proper reading of these 
sections. 
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ready removability of the collateral puts the title searcher on his 
guard. But applicability of section 9-401(3) Avould make ordinary 
UCC filings prior to affixation universally good against real estate title 
searchers. Real estate claimants would therefore be forced to under­
take the search of the UCC files in derogation of the legislative intent, 
because they could never be sure that a UCC filing would not "con­
tinue effective" against them under section 9-401(3). In essence, the 
liberal rule of section 9-313(4)(c) would be made generally applicable 
to all kinds of collateral and would swallow up section 9-313(4)(a), in 
that preaffixation perfection of any kind would be universally effec­
tive against all prior or subsequent real estate claimants. This is 
especially true because section 9-401(3) contains no good faith re­
quirement of any kind, as does section 9-401(2). Therefore, a secured 
party could rely on a UCC filing before affixation and would never 
have an incentive to make a fixture filing, as required by subsections 
9-313(4)(a) and (b).'®° 
For this reason, the only acceptable reading of the statutes is that 
subsections 9-401(2) and (3) do not correct errors in complying with 
section 9-402.^®' Furthermore, even if the secured party has correctly 
listed the real estate and the other required items, so that there are no 
omissions, section 9-401(3) should never be used under any circum­
stances in a fixture case, since its use would obliterate a key objective 
of section 9-313—limitation of the real estate title search. A secured 
party who has made a UCC filing prior to affixation should be re­
quired to make a fixture filing to gain priority over purchasers, mort­
gagees and prior lien creditors, unless the collateral falls within the 
"readily removable" category of section 9-313(4) (c). 
Professor Adams adds a sophisticated statutory argument to support this view. He believes 
that section 9-401(3) was available under the 1962 Code to save fixture lenders, a view with 
which I take issue, since it would have destroyed the reliability of the real estate records with 
regard to fixtures. He goes on to note that the "proper place" to file a financing statement for 
goods that, at the time of attachment, are not intended to be fixtures was wherever other 
nonfixture filings had to be made. Professor Adams comes to this conclusion from the following 
language which appeared in all three alternatives for section 9-401(1) of the 1962 Code; "when 
the collateral is goods which at the time the security attaches are or are to become fixtures . . . 
then [the filing must be] in the office where a mortgage on the real estate . . . would be filed or 
recorded . . . ."In 1972, the italicized words were dropped. This is consistent with the view that 
it is never appropriate to file a financing statement on future fixtures in the same place where a 
financing statement on nonfixture collateral would be filed, which in turn supports the view that 
section 9-401(3) does not relieve the secured party from having to refile a fixture filing after 
affixation. See Adams, supra note 1, at 923. 
Adams, supra note 1, at 917, specifically recognizes that seetion 9-401(3) does not cure 
omissions of information required under section 9-402 of the 1962 Code. If it was true in 1972, it 
must have been just as true in 1962. 
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Incidentally, a secured party whose collateral becomes affixed 
after the security interest attaches is in for a rude shock if he wishes to 
correct his filing so that it can become a fixture filing. Such an action 
will frequently be necessary whenever affixation was not initially 
contemplated. Section 9-402 generally requires the debtor to sign the 
financing statement, but numerous exceptions are made where vari­
ous kinds of corrections are needed. For instance, when the collateral 
is moved or the debtor changes his location to a new state, when 
proceeds are generated, or when the financing statement is about to 
lapse under section 9-403(2) because five years have gone by since the 
initial filing, the secured party may file without the debtor s signa­
ture.All other amendments to the financing statement must be 
signed by the debtor.Obviously missing from this list of exceptions 
to the rule that the debtor must sign is the case where the debtor 
affixes encumbered goods to his real estate. Here the debtor could 
refuse to sign any amended financing statement; nothing in the UCC 
permits the secured party to proceed unilaterally. Nothing short of 
equitable relief can enable the secured party to refile so that a proper 
fixture filing is in place. 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the Review Committee's goal to rid section 9-
313 of its confusing aspects, the 1972 amendments have resulted in a 
set of fixture rules that are quite complex. The question may fairly be 
asked, "What is wrong with complexity?" It just may be that on a 
functional level there is nothing wrong with the complexity of section 
9-313, especially if one believes that fixture priorities are infrequently 
litigated and that this entire subject has marginal impact upon our 
economy. ^ ®^ Furthermore, the 1972 version represents a political com­
promise; one can hardly expect anything but a hopeless jumble when 
compromise is required. Nevertheless, the law of fixtures deserves to 
be something more than an asymmetrical morass in an otherwise well 
integrated statute. 
In the interest of classical symmetry and beauty of design, I 
would therefore propose that prior lien creditors be defeasible by 
•"2 u.c.c. § 9-402(2) (1972). 
See id. § 9-402(4). 
According to Professor Henson, fixture priorities are litigated only in times of declining real 
estate values, where the sales price is not high enough to satisfy the claims of all the secured 
parties. See R. Henson, supra note 34, § 8-1, at 292. But see Coogan, supra note 7, at 1187 
(fixture priorities are "important"). 
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ordinary UCC filings in purchase money cases, that any subsequent 
real estate claimant be defeasible by a prior UCC filing under section 
9-313(4)(c) (even where the filing is after affixation), that purchase 
money status be eliminated from section 9-3I3(4)(a),'®® and that a 
grace period against subsequent lien creditors be given to secured 
parties in purchase money cases. Furthermore, discretionary advances 
under a junior mortgage should not be permitted to become senior 
over a perfected security interest.'®® No doubt these suggestions will 
have little impact on the current trajectory of the American economy, 
whatever that may be, but they would lend some symmetry to an 
otherwise inexplicably bizarre set of priorities for security interests in 
fixtures under the UCC. 
The reason purchase money security interests are even mentioned in section 9-313(4)(a) is 
that the drafters apparently wanted to draw a parallel to section 9-312(4). U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a) 
comment 4(a) (1972). That is, only purchase money security interests deserve grace periods. See 
id. § 9-313 (Reasons for 1972 Change). That may be true with regard to grace periods, but it 
does not follow that only purchase money security interests should defeat prior real estate 
claimants. Purchase money priority is based on a variation of "first in time is first in right and 
on the basis that purchase money collateral increases the debtor's estate, so that denial of the 
increase to prior parties is not prejudicial. See supra text accompanying notes 15-23. But these 
reasons apply to all fixture security interests, regardless of purchase money status. Thus, a fixture 
interest, where attachment precedes affixation, is first in time, and the addition of encumbered 
fixtures to the real estate is a windfall to the prior real estate claimants unless superpriority is 
given to the fixture lender. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. Therefore, we should 
eliminate purchase money status from section 9-313(4) (a) in general, so that any security interest 
can take priority over earlier real estate claimants. If parallelism is valued, perhaps the grace 
period could be reserved for purchase money security interests, but it should apply as well to 
purchase money security interests in collateral that qualify under section 9-313(4)(c). 
See supra note 73. 
